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PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND USE-
FUL ARTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE COPYRIGHT
OFFICE REPORT ON GENERAL REVISION
OF THE UNITED STATES
COPYRIGHT LAW'
Morton David Goldbergt
I invite you to participate in the writing of a new copyright law. If his-
tory is a reliable guide, you and I are not likely to have another oppor-
tunity to do so in our careers.2
On July 7, 1961 the Librarian of Congress transmitted to Congress
a document entitled COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: Report of the
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright
Law.3 The end product of a series of copyright law revision studies con-
ducted by the Copyright Office over several years,4 the Report contains
the tentative recommendations of the Copyright Office for the revision
of the present Copyright Act,5 which is essentially the statute enacted
by Congress in 1909.6 The present article attempts to summarize these
recommendations and their background;7 to suggest, in some instances,
alternative proposals; and to set forth certain principles for application
f See contributors' section, masthead p. 631, for biographical data.
1 Copyright @ 1962 Morton David Goldberg. All Rights Reserved. For helpful comments
on this article, the writer acknowledges especial gratitude to Barbara A. Ringer and Alan
Latman. However, neither Miss Ringer nor Mr. Latman is necessarily of the same views as
expressed herein, for which views the writer is solely responsible.
2 Address by Hon. Abraham L. Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights, at annual meeting of
ABA Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, Aug. 5, 1961, Proceedings, 122.
3 Staff of Subcomm. No. 3 (Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights), House Committee on
the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), cited hereinafter as "Report."
No general revision bill is pending in Congress at the present time, but the Copyright
Office is presently preparing a tentative draft of such a bill.
4 These studies, sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "Copyright Office Studies," have
been published as a series of eleven Senate Committee Prints by the Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. They
comprise to the writer's knowledge the most encyclopaedic treatment extant of the American
copyright law, including its legislative and judicial history and its comparison with the
laws of other countries. See note 26, infra.
5 17 U.S.C. (1958). Unless otherwise indicated by the context, references herein to "the act"
are to this title, and section references, to the sections as presently codified therein.
6 Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-64 (1958).
7 In discussing the cases and predecessor acts, the writer has made no attempt to duplicate
the excellent treatment thereof available in the Copyright Office Studies, see notes 4, supra,
and 26, infra. Moreover, the introduction to each of the recommendations in the Report
itself contains a helpful summary of the context within which the respective recommenda-
tions are to be considered. The references in this article are therefore foreshortened to those
deemed necessary for comprehension of the discussion.
To impose a working limitation on the discussion itself, the article has been confined
arbitrarily to the explicit questions with which the Report's recommendations are concerned.
Accordingly, the scope of the article does not include discussion of the droit moral (moral
right), droit de suite, lending right, domaine public payant, etc.
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in the consideration of copyright law revision. This ,writer supports
most of the Report's recommendations; issue can be taken with some
of them-as this article does--but the Report constitutes a distinguished
contribution by the Register of Copyrights and his able staff to furthering
the cause of copyright law revision.
The Report's summary of its recommendations9 is set forth in the
Appendix at the conclusion of this article.
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I.
THE NEED FOR COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
Legal commentators often decry the incursions of outmoded statutes
upon common sense. Nowhere is such criticism more applicable, however,
than in the unreality of the present copyright law. For example: (1)
A book written by an American is printed, bound and first published
in Great Britain but is not published in the United States within five
years thereafter. By reason of this sequence, the work has entered the
public domain in this country.' ° (In this context, it is unfortunate for the
writer of the book that he is an American citizen, for had he been a
national of any other country in the world, he would have been able to
obtain United States copyright immediately upon the first publication
of his book in Britain." (2) A new play, never before disseminated to
the public, is broadcast to an audience of millions. Under the Copyright
Act, there has been no "publication" of the play, 2 with the result that
the "common law right" continues in perpetuity despite the exploitation
of the work. (3) An author'- who for valuable consideration assigns to
a publisher rights in his work for the renewal term of copyright can
thereafter execute a will leaving the renewal copyright to a third party.
If, before the time for renewal of the copyright, the author dies leaving
no widow or children, his legatee-and not the publisher-will receive
the rights under the renewal copyright.'
4
The anachronistic 1909 Copyright Act has been recognized as need-
ing revision almost from the time of its enactment. 5 The days of the
10 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 9(c), 16, 22, 23 (1958).
11 17 U.S.C. § 9(c) (1958); Universal Copyright Convention, art. II ( 1 1), art. III( 1).
12 Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), modified
and aff'd 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936). Nutt v. National Institute, 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929);
DeMille v. Casey, 12 Misc. 78 201 N.Y. Supp. 20 (Sup Ct. N.Y. 1923). See Public Affairs
Associates v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd per curiam on other
grounds, 369 U.S. 111 (1962). But see Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126
F. Supp. 54, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91
F. Supp. 473, 475 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
13 The term "author" is used in this article interchangeably with the term "creator," and
except where the context indicates otherwise includes both natural persons and legal entities
(for example, a corporation which is an employer in the case of a work made for hire,
17 U.S.C. § 26 (1958)) who create any form of copyrightable work, including a book, play,
musical composition, motion picture, photograph, painting, etc. The term "user" in this
article includes any person or legal entity who or which exercises rights as a licensee or
assignee by publishing the work or recording it, broadcasting it, making a motion picture
based on it, etc. A user may also be a creator, as where a motion picture company creates
a copyrighted motion picture based on an underlying copyrighted novel or on an original
screen play.
'4 Miller Music Corp. v. Daniels, 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
15 See Goldman, "The History of U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to 1954,"
Copyright Law Revision Study No. 1, infra note 26, at 4 (1960).
Cf. the following President's Message to Congress:
Our copyright laws urgently need revision. They are imperfect in definition, confused
and inconsistent in expression; they omit provision for many articles which, under
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nickelodeon, the pianola roll and the slow printing press, moreover,
have long since given way to the sound (and smell) motion picture, to
the long-playing record, and to printing presses on different continents
activated simultaneously by electronic typesetter. Radio and television
were without significance in 1909 but now constitute an integral part
of contemporary life. New microphotographic and electronic means
of information processing, storage and retrieval are with us.16 The
publishing and "amusement" industry has now matured into an estimated
six-billion dollar component of our total national income.
1 7
The 1909 act was the third of the three general revisions-1831,18
187019 and 1909-which have been enacted since the first copyright
statute in 1790.2 Although changes in technology and business practices
have vastly accelerated since 1909, the forthcoming revision of the 1909
act comes after a lapse of almost sixty years as compared with an
interval of approximately forty years in enacting each of the three prior
general revisions.2 '
In the period between World Wars I and II, several revision bills were
introduced in Congress' which were intended in part to bring the 1909
modern reproductive processes, are entitled to protection; they impose hardships upon
the copyright proprietor which are not essential to the fair protection of the public;
they are difficult for the Courts to interpret and impossible for the Copyright Office to
administer with satisfaction to the public.
Message of President Theodore Roosevelt to Congress, December, 1905, quoted in H. R.
Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1909), which accompanied the bill, H. R. 28192,
which became the 1909 Act.
16 Of special interest to lawyers is the project currently being conducted by the American
Bar Foundation utilizing electronic data retrieval equipment to produce a running index
of the approximately 35,000 annual state enactments. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1962,
p. 17, col. 6. See also Freed, "Prepare Now for Machine-Assisted Legal Research," 47
A.BA.J. 764 (1961).
17 See Blaisdell, "Size of the Copyright Industries," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 2,
infra note 27 (1960). According to this study, the copyright industries contributed in 1954
more to the total national income than mining or banking or the electric and gas utilities.
Ibid.
18 Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
19 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 214.
20 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
21 Somewhat similar delays in needed copyright law revision have been noted in several
countries including the United Kingdom and Canada. In the United Kingdom, the so-called
"Gregory Committee," of which Mr. H. S. Gregory was Chairman, was appointed in 1951
to consider the need for revision of that country's Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5,
c. 46. As a result of the "Gregory Report," Report of the Copyright Committee Presented
by the President of the Board of Trade to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty,
October, 1952, Parliament enacted the Copyright Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74. The
present Canadian statute, Revised Statutes of 1952, ch. 55, is essentially that country's
Copyright Act of 1921, which was patterned after the United Kingdom's Copyright Act of
1911, supra. In 1954 Canada appointed the Royal Commission on Patents, Trade Marks and
Industrial Designs to make recommendations, inter alia, concerning the need for revision
of the Canadian copyright law. The Commission's Report on Copyright was submitted to
the Governor General on August 1, 1957. As of this writing Canada has passed no general
revision of its law, although a bill, "An Act to Provide for Copyright in Canada and to
Implement the Universal Copyright Convention," C-70, 5th Sess., 24th Parl., 10-11 Eliz. II
(1962) is presently pending in Parliament.
22 See Goldman, supra note 15, at 4-11.
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act up to date and in large measure to make the amendments necessary
for American membership in the Berne Union.- None of these general
revision bills were enacted.24 After World War II, the United States,
under the aegis of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), participated with other countries
in the development of a copyright convention which would be an alterna-
tive to membership in the Berne Union. The resulting Universal Copyright
Convention25 became effective in the United States in 1955 and ac-
commodates, as the various versions of the Berne Convention do not,
certain characteristic features of the United States copyright law, such
as the use of a copyright notice in all copies of published works and
the dual term (original and renewal) of copyright for successive periods
of years.
The present program for copyright law revision proceeds on a firmer
foundation than the previous general revision bills. Over a period
of more than five years commencing in 1955, the Copyright Office has
undertaken a program of thirty-four separate studies of the major
problems to be covered in drafting a revised Copyright Act. 6 The
23 The Berne Union, formally designated as the International Union for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, consists of almost fifty countries which adhere to the
original Berne Convention of 1886 and/or one or more of the revisions thereof adopted in
Paris (1896), Berlin (1908), Rome (1928) and Brussels (1948). See 75 Le Droit d'Auteur
20-23 (1962).
24 The "Vestal bill," H.R. 12549, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930), passed the House but was
not brought to a vote in the Senate. See Goldman, supra note 15, at 5-7, for the legislative
history. The "Duffy bill," S. 3047, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), passed the 'Senate but was
not brought to a vote in the House. See Goldman, supra note 15, at 8-9.
25 [19521 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2731. This Convention is sometimes hereinafter referred
to as the "UCC2'
26 See note 4, supra. Under the auspices of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A., the
Copyright Office Studies are presently being prepared for incorporation in the near future in
two bound volumes as a memorial to the late Arthur Fisher, the Register of Copyrights
who initiated the Studies and to whom much is owed for the United States participation
in the Universal Copyright Convention and the current revision program. The Studies, as
incorporated in the Senate Committee Prints (Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and
Copyrights, Sen. Comm. on the judiciary 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print) 1960), are as
follows:
First print:
1. The History of U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision 1901-1954; by A. A. Goldman.
2. Size of the Copyright Industries; by W. M. Blaisdell.
3. The Meaning of "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution; by staff mem-
bers of N.Y.U. Law Review under the guidance of Professor Waiter Derenberg.
4. The Moral Right of the Author; by William S. Strauss.
Second print:
5. The Compulsory License Provisions of the U.S. Copyright Law; by Professor Harry
G. Henn.
6. Economic Aspects of the Compulsory License; by W. M. Blaisdell.
Third print:
7. Notice of Copyright; by Vincent A. Doyle, George D. Cary, Marjory McCannon, and
Barbara A. Ringer.
8. Commercial Use of the Copyright Notice; by W. M. Blaisdell.
9. Use of the Copyright Notice by Libraries; by Joseph W. Rogers.
10. False Use of Copyright Notice; by Caruthers Berger.
Fourth print:
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Report is based upon the results of these studies. It constitutes an ex-
cellent, impartial view of the present Act, its defects and certain pro-
posed remedies. The recommendations contained in it are acknowledged
by the Copyright Office to be tentative and, as such, intended to serve
as a basis for discussion of copyright law revision 7
A major portion of this article is devoted to a discussion of the pro-
posals in Chapters IV ("Unpublished Works: Common Law and Statu-
tory Protection") and V ("Duration of Copyright") of the Report 8
11. Divisibility of Copyright; by Abraham L. Kaminstein with supplements by Lorna
G. Margolis and Arpad Bogsch.
12. Joint Ownership of Copyrights; by George D. Cary.
13. Works Made for Hire and on Commission; by Borge Varmer.
Fifth print:
14. Fair Use of Copyrighted Works; by Alan Latman.
15. Photo duplication of Copyrighted Material by Libraries; by Borge Varmer.
16. Limitations on Performing Rights; by Borge Varmer.
Sixth print:
17. The Registration of Copyright; by Professor Benjamin Kaplan.
18. Authority of the Register of Copyrights to Reject Applications for Registration; by
Caruthers Berger.
19. The Recordation of Copyright Assignments and Licenses; by Alan Latman assisted
by Lorna G. Margolis and Marcia Kaplan.
Seventh print:
20. Deposit of Copyrighted Works; by Elizabeth K. Dunne.
21. The Catalog of Copyright Entries; by Elizabeth K. Dunne and Joseph W. Rogers.
Eighth print:
22. The Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law; by William S. Strauss.
23. The Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An Exploratory
Study; by Professor Ralph S. Brown, assisted by William A. O'Brien and Herbert
Turkington.
24. Remedies Other Than Damages for Copyright Infringement; by William S. Strauss.
25. Liability of Innocent Infringers of Copyrights; by Alan Latman and William S. Tager.
Ninth print:
26. The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings; by Barbara A. Ringer.
27. Copyright in Architectural Works; by William S. Strauss.
28. Copyright in Choreographic Works; by Borge Varmer.
Tenth print:
29. Protection of Unpublished Works; by William S. Strauss.
30. Duration of Copyright; by James L. Guinan.
31. Renewal of Copyright; by Barbara A. Ringer.
Eleventh print:
32. Protection of Works of Foreign Origin; by Arpad Bogsch.
33. Copyright in Government Publications; by Caruthers Berger.
34. Copyright in Territories and Possessions of the U.S.; by Borge Varmer.
A 12th Senate committee print contains a subject index to the 34 studies.
27 The following are among the discussions of the Report which have reached print at
the time of this writing: ABA, Copyright Symposium on General Revision of the Law
9 Bull. Cr. Soc. 7 (1961): Henn, "Introduction"; Kaminstein, "Copyright Law Revision";
Peterson, "Duration of Copyright"; Sargoy, "Formalities and Ownership"; Wasserstrom,
"The Copyrightee's Rights and Remedies"; Finkelstein, "Music Rights-Another Vestige
of U.S. Cultural Downgrading," Variety, Jan. 10, 1962, p. 186, col. 1; Goldman, "Tentative
Recommendations of the Copyright Office on the Revision of the Copyright Law: Problems
of Interest to Libraries," 55 Law. L.J. 3 (1962); Kubilius, "The Copyright Law-A
Warning," Book Production, 53 (1961); Latman, "Copyright Office Recommendations for
a New Copyright Law," 52 Special Libraries 514 (1961); Wittenberg, "Copyright Law
Revision: Report of the Register of Copyrghts," Library Q. 73 (1962); Infinity
(editorial), October, 1961, p. 19.
28 See note 8, supra. Chs. IV and V of the Report are discussed herein in pts. II and III,
respectively.
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I shall first discuss these proposals and then comment on the balance
of the Report.
II
UNPUBLISHED WORKS: COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY PROTECTION 2 9
A. The Present Dual System
The United States now has a dual system of copyright: protection
under common law;30 and protection under federal statute (presently
the 1909 act, as amended) enacted under the eighth clause of article
I, section 8 of the Constitution. 31 The common law protects a work from
the time of its creation; and if the work is never published the protection
lasts in perpetuity.' The traditional rule is that the common law protec-
tion is lost, however, upon the first publication of the work.3 For all
works deemed copyrightable under the act, the statute makes protection
available from the date of their publication. 4 The act also provides that
certain classes of works may be registered for statutory copyright even
though still unpublished.33 It has been held that upon the registration
of unpublished works for statutory copyright, the perpetual common
law right is lost and the statutory copyright "for limited times" is sub-
stituted in its stead.36 State law defines the scope of the common law
29 Report ch. IV, at 37-43. For the general background, see Strauss, "Protection of
Unpublished Works," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 29, supra note 26 at 1 (1957).
30 For an excellent exposition of the early evolution of the common law system in
England and its later evolution in the United States, see Whicher, "The Ghost of Donaldson
v. Beckett: an Inquiry into the Constitutional Distribution of Powers over the Law of
Literary Property in the United States," pt. I, 9 Bull. Cr. Soc. 102 (1961) ; pt. II, id. 194
(1962), a brilliant exercise in historical legal scholarship.
31 "The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
32 But see note 82, infra.
33 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408,
98 Eng. Rep. 257 [H.L. 17741. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp.
54, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473,
475 (N.D. 111. 1950).
The qualifying phrase, "traditional," is used advisedly in the text. Notwithstanding the
obeisance of courts and commentators to the Wheaton decision down through the years, the
reader is urged to study with a fresh eye the critique of this decision in Whicher, supra
note 30, at 203-14. Compare Whicher, supra, with Strauss, "Protection of Unpublished
Works," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 29, supra note 26, at 1 (1957):
It is the accepted rule of law that the property right which the author has under the
common law is terminated by publication of the work. After publication, rights in
intellectual works must be defended under the copyright statute.
34 "Any person entitled thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work by
publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this title. .. " 17 U.S.C. § 10
(1958).
35 Primarily lectures, plays, musical compositions, works of art, technical drawings,
photographs and motion pictures. Not included are books, periodicals, maps, reproductions
of works of art, prints and pictorial illustrations. 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
36 Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 220 Fed. 448 (2d Cir.
1915); Universal Film Co. v. Copperman, 218 Fed. 577 (2d Cir. 1914); Loew's, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 18 Cal. 2d 419, 115 P.2d 983 (1941). Cf. Globe Newspapers Co. v. Walker,
210 U.S. 356 (1908). But see Whicher, supra note 30 at 111-12.
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right, as well as providing the remedies for its infringement, whereas
the federal act provides the remedies for infringement of statutory
copyright.
The restrictive concept of "publication" in the present act8 7 has
resulted in the anomaly of wide dissemination of works to the public
through such media as phonograph recordings, broadcasts, and live
stage performances with presumably no loss of common law protec-
tion.3" The protection of such works is thus deemed to continue in
perpetuity, notwithstanding their wide public dissemination. The concept
of perpetual protection of disseminated works, however, runs counter to
two major theories of common law protection: first, the theory that the
constitutional provision securing copyrights to authors only "for limited
times"139 also imposes a similar finite limitation on the duration of
common law protection; 40  and second, the theory that perpetual
protection for a work continuing to remunerate the author offends the
bargain which the author has struck with society (i.e., in return for the
author's creative contribution to the commonweal, society agrees to
give him the exclusive right to exploit his contribution, but not forever).
The historical validity of either theory may be criticized,4'1 but it is
nonetheless likely that public policy will favor the author's exclusive
domain over his disseminated work for a limited period, beyond which
the domain should be that of the public.
37 The act does not define "publication," but does state that
'the date of publication' shall in the case of a work of which copies are reproduced
for sale or distribution be held to be the earliest date when copies of the first authorized
edition were placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed by the proprietor of the copy-
right or under his authority....
17 U.S.C. J 26 (1958). Compare this definition with the definition of "publication" under
the Universal Copyright Convention: "'Publication', as used in this Convention, means
the reproduction in tangible form and the general distribution to the public of copies of a
work from which it can be read or otherwise visually perceived." UCC. art. VI.
38 See cases cited supra note 12.
39 Supra, note 31.
40 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 666-67 (2d Cir.
1955) (dissenting opinion of Learned Hand, Cir. J.):
[Under the argument that] New York should be deemed free, sub nomine "unfair
competition," to determine what conduct shall constitute a "publication" of a "work"
not covered by the Copyright Act . . . [it] could grant to an author a perpetual
monopoly, although he exploited the "work" with all the freedom he would have
enjoyed, had it been copyrighted. I cannot believe that the failure of Congress to
include within the Act all that the Clause [i.e., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8] covers should give
the states so wide a power. To do so would pro tanto defeat the overriding purpose of
the Clause, which was to grant only for "limited Times" the untrammelled exploitation
of an author's "Writings." Either he must be content with such circumscribed exploita-
tion as does not constitute "publication," or he must eventually dedicate his "work" to
the public. . . . I would hold . . . that the states are not free to follow their own
notions as to when an author's right shall be unlimited both in user and in duration.
Such power of course they have as to "works" that are not "Writings"; but I submit
that, once it is settled that a "work" is in that class, the Clause enforces upon the
author the choice I have just mentioned....
41 See Whicher, supra note 30, passim, and especially at 109, 111-12 and 201.
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B. The Report's Recommendations
These discrepancies between "dissemination" and "publication" com-
prise the basic premise for the Report's position that, although the
common law right should not be abolished, it should be greatly limited.
Specifically, it recommends that, where the author has fixed the work in
some tangible form, statutory copyright should commence not with
"publication" alone, but with any form of "public dissemination,"
including registration of the work in the Copyright Office." Inasmuch
as little reason exists to continue the present system of permitting regis-
tration in unpublished form for some copyrightable works but not
others,44 the Report also recommends that voluntary registration in
unpublished form be made available for all copyrightable works.4"
The Report deals with protection of certain undisseminated manu-
scripts and other private papers by recommending46 that when any
"holder" (semble, either the author, his heirs or any third party who has
come into possession of such papers) has made the papers accessible to
the public in an archive, the literary and artistic content of the papers
,should pass into the public domain when the papers are fifty years old
and have been in the institution for more than ten years. An exception
would be made, however, where the owner of the literary property rights
has registered with the Copyright Office a claim for copyright which is
still subsisting.
But the Report goes no further in limiting common law protection by
substituting a federal right. Rather, three reasons appear47 for its position
that common law protection should not be completely abolished in
deference to an exclusive federal jurisdiction over copyright matters.
First, the argument is made that the time limit which the Constitution
would impose on protection under the federal statute would be inadequate
for the protection of undisseminated private papers whose authors would
wish to protect against unauthorized disclosure for prolonged periods
during life and after death. Fear of infringement of the "right of privacy,"
the Report reasons, would induce some authors to destroy papers which
would be valuable for researchers and scholars. Second, until works are
disseminated they are likely to be matters of purely private and local
concern and should therefore be left to the province of state law and
42 See text at note 93, infra.
43 Report, at 43.
44 See note 35, supra.
45 Report, at 43.
46 Ibid.
47 Id. at 41-42.
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state courts for adjudication of what are essentially "private rights."48
And third, the availability of voluntary registration for ,all classes of
works (as recommended by the Report) would permit those wishing to
obtain the benefits of statutory copyright to do so even if the work has
not been disseminated.
C. An Alternative Recommendation
The writer proposes for consideration that the revision of the act
should go further with respect to the protection of undisseminated works:
the concept of separate common law protection of literary and artistic
works should be abolished, and such works protected from the time of
their creation under federal statute.
Many proposals for copyright law revision have merit; few are without
difficulties. If the writer's proposal has merit, it would be unique in
neither respect.4 9 I submit, however, that the advantages of supplanting
the present dual system of copyright with a single system of federal
protection outweigh the possible difficulties and, on balance, would be
more favorable than a continuation of even the modified dual system
proposed by the Report. The advantages include at least the following:
1. Easier access to unpublished letters and manuscripts. The Report
states that the elimination of perpetual common law protection and the
imposition of a copyright term of limited duration upon unpublished
works might induce authors to destroy manuscripts and private papers
for fear of unauthorized disclosure against which they would be without
remedy. 0 The solution proposed by the Report is to retain the perpetual
common law right except where the manuscripts or papers have been
deposited in a public archive. 5' The writer suggests that a better solution
would be provided for all such works, whether or not deposited in
an archive, by a copyright term of sufficient length to assuage the
fears of all but the most apprehensive author. Such a term would be
measured by his own life and a substantial period thereafter 2 (e.g., fifty
48 The late Judge Learned Hand took a similar position, although he advocated a fixed
time limit after which works would enter the public domain or, alternatively, the transfer
of the "literary property" in the work to the owner of the physical manuscript after a fixed
period. See his letter to the Copyright Office, April 23, 1959, excerpted in appendix to
Strauss, 'Protection of Unpublished Works," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 29, supra
note 26, at 52 (1957).
49 Nor, of course, is the proposal itself unique with the writer. See, e.g., the "Dallinger
bill," H.R. 9137, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); the "Sirovich bill," H.R. 10364, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1930). See also Strauss, supra note 48, at 32-37. The United Kingdom Act of
1956 states expressly that, with certain exceptions not relevant here, "no copyright, or right
in the nature of copyright, shall subsist other than" under that act. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74,
§ 46(5) [1956]. The term of protection is, however, unlimited for undisseminated works.
See id., § 2(3).
50 Report, at 41.
51 Id. at 43.
52 It is of course possible to have a general term of copyright commence with the crea-,
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years5 ), during which no unauthorized use could be made of his unpub-
lished writings.
Moreover, the somewhat complicated scheme recommended by the
Report,5 is in many cases unnecessary: the author or his executors or
heirs can bind contractually any archive in which papers are deposited,
so that, if desired, the archive must withhold such papers from publication
for a period even longer than the term of copyright. The possibility of
such a contractual arrangement does not, of course, assist the cause of
the writer of personal letters (i.e., correspondence), which would cus-
tomarily be in the hands of the recipients, not the author's. But for un-
published manuscripts, a contract with the archive could, by its terms,
restrict access or publication to whatever extent the author or his heirs
might deem desirable.
In its recommendation the Report does not take sufficient account of
the classic problem-hunting down the heirs of the author of a newly
discovered manuscript which has never been placed in a public archive.
No one would bother tracking down the heirs of Caesar to render unto
them what is theirs, but on the other hand, one would not be well-advised
to publish without authorization a newly discovered manuscript by Mark
Twain.55 Somewhere between the dates of death of these two writers
there would seem to be an equitable point as which the line should be
drawn: on the one hand, heirs of a deceased writer should not suffer
needless embarrassment (nor be deprived of rightful income); on the
other hand, a publisher should not be confronted unreasonably with the
choice either of a costly search of heirs and an examination of wills and
probate proceedings or of the apprehension of a lawsuit instituted by
the great-great-grandson of the author. A grant of protection of the
literary property for the author's life and a significant period thereafter
would provide an equitable solution.
2. Greater national uniformity. In our contemporary society the
protection of undisseminated works can no longer be considered a matter
of merely local concern. 5 The letters of a distinguished author are of
tion of the work and run for a flat period of years thereafter. For natural authors, how-
ever, a term of "life-plus" would appear to present the lesser evidentiary problem of
establishing the date of the author's death rather than the greater problem of establishing
the year of creation of a given work.
53 The term in most of the major countries in the world for the works authored by a
natural person is generally the life of the author plus fifty years. Art. 7 of the 1948
Brussels version of the Berne Convention grants a term of protection of that duration for
most literary, dramatic and musical works.
54 See note 46, supra.
55 See Chamberlain v. Feldman, 300 N.Y. 135, 89 N.E. 2d 863 (1949).
56 However, for a contrasting view, see the comments of judge Learned Hand, cited in
note 48, supra.
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national and international significance. The private diaries of an erst-
while President surely should not receive one measure of protection if
he has deposited them in Missouri but another if the deposit has been
in Pennsylvania. On the contrary, the need for national uniformity
with respect to such matters increases. The rights and remedies of an
author submitting a story outline to a television network in New York
should be no different from those of an author submitting the same
outline to the same network in California.5 7 Although these difficulties
may be alleviated by the Report's suggestion that voluntary registration
(and consequent securing of statutory copyright) be permitted for all
categories of undisseminated works, I submit that such a measure does
not go far enough in obtaining the desired national uniformity. 8 The
creator and the user may well ask why their rights in, literary property
should have fifty-one variants. No virtue resides in tradition per se.
Not infrequently the layman's common sense should be accorded weight
in evaluating the merit of time-encrusted traditions such as the demarca-
tions of state and federal jurisdiction.
3. Fewer evidentiary problems. The Report recommends that statu-
tory copyright should commence when a work has been "publicly dis-
seminated.15 9 The amount of litigated confusion, however, over whether
a work has been "published"160 would appear to be of substantially lesser
magnitude than the litigation likely to arise over whether a work has
been "publicly disseminated." And the determinations of law as to the
significance of the size and circumstance of the group to which the work
was allegedly "disseminated" would seem to be even less troublesome
than the findings of fact which would be necessary with respect to
obscure and little-remembered first public presentations of works half
a century old and more. The comparison of the evidentiary burdens
implicit in the Report's proposal and those to be encountered under a
single federal copyright system is discussed below.61
57 But compare Grombach v. Waring, 293 N.Y. 609, 59 N.E.2d 425 (1944) with Kurlan
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953). Similar prob-
lems arise in multistate questions of defamation: Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948); and privacy and unfair competition: Ettore
v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926
(1956).
48 Also, quaere, whether the fundamental policy question of the applicability of state or
federal law to such works should be left to the choice of individual authors.
59 Report, at 43.
60 See, e.g., American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1956); Patterson
v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655 (1938);
Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950);
Jewelers Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872
(1898).
01 See text at notes 98-105, infra.
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4. Closer alignment of the United States copyright law with that of
major foreign countries. By virtue of United States adherence to the
Universal Copyright Convention, we have achieved the substantial bene-
fits of a multilateral agreement with the major countries of Western
Europe. A closer alignment of the United States copyright system with
those of major foreign countries, however, will facilitate further increased
international cooperation in the protection of literary and artistic prop-
erty. Such a clear alignment is even now being sought in the joint meet-
ings which the UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee, act-
ing under the Universal Copyright Convention, and the Permanent Com-
mittee of the Berne Union have been holding during the last several
years on common problems. 2 A "neighboring rights" convention, 63 for
example, has been proposed for adherence by UCC member countries
as well as those of the Berne Union. We must not be deprived of the
opportunity to participate in international progress because of the idio-
syncrasies of the United States copyright system.
D. Possible Difficulties in the Suggested Alternative to the Report's
Recommendation
It must, of course, be recognized that the complete abolition of common
law copyright in favor of blanket statutory copyright from creation also
presents certain problems. These problems include the following:
1. Compliance with United States obligations under the Universal
Copyright Convention with respect to unpublished works;
2. Observing the constitutional requirement of due process 4 with
respect to depriving owners of their perpetual common law literary
property rights in pre-existing works; and
3. Fixing the period of protection for works where a measuring
life may not be applicable, such as anonymous, pseudonymous and
posthumous works and works created by corporate entities.6 5
1. United States obligations under the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion with respect to unpublished works. The United States has two
obligations under the UCC which are relevant here. First, any revision
of the present Act must permit the continuation of a system of protecting
62 See, e.g., the report of the proceedings of the Madrid meeting of September 25-30, 1961,
74 Le Droit d'Auteur 318 (1961), reprinted 9 Bull. Cr. Soc. 230 (1962).
63 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations, adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on Neighboring
Rights, Rome, October 10-12, 1961. See 74 Le Droit d'Auteur 346 (1961).
04 See note 79, infra.
65 This problem is discussed in connection with duration. See text at notes 106-08, infra.
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without formalities the unpublished works of foreign nationals."" And
second, the term of United States protection for Convention works must
be not less than the life of the author and twenty-five years thereafter;
or, if the term is not computed on the basis of the life of the author, the
United States is "entitled" to compute the term from the date of first
publication or prior registration, provided the term is not less than twenty-
five years from the date of such first publication or prior registration.67
Accordingly, a mandate of formalities such as registration and deposit
as prerequisites for protection of unpublished works under the revised
act would likely be inconsistent with the first of these two obligations
under the UCC. As recognized by the Report,6 8 however, there are certain
advantages to the continuation of these features of our copyright system.
A satisfactory reconciliation of these features with the UCC requirements
might be made by providing that registration and deposit would be pre-
requisites not for copyright per se but for additional rights or remedies
to which the owner of a work would not otherwise be entitled. Such
advantages might include a lengthened term of protection or extraordinary
remedies such as statutory damages.6 9
The minimum term of protection of life plus twenty-five years required
by the UCC would present no conceptual problem with respect to the
unpublished works of identified natural authors. But with regard to
unpublished works authored by legal entities other than natural persons,
there could be no measuring life. For such works there is authority to
the effect that the UCC prescribes no minimum term.7" The United
106 "In each Contracting State there shall be legal means of protecting without formalities
the unpublished works of nationals of other Contracting States." UCC art. In, II 4.
67 2. The term of protection for works protected under this Convention shall not be
less than the life of the author and 25 years after his death.
However, any Contracting State which, on the effective date of this Convention in
that State, has limited this term for certain classes of works to a period computed from
the first publication of the work, shall be entitled to maintain these exceptions and to
extend them to other classes of works. For all these classes the term of protection shall
not be less than 25 years from the date of first publication.
Any Contracting State which, upon the effective date of this Convention in that State,
does not compute the term of protection upon the basis of the life of the author, shall
be entitled to compute the term of protection from the date of the first publication of
the work or from its registration prior to publication, as the case may be, provided the
term of protection shall not be less than 25 years from the date of first publication or
from its registration prior to publication, as the case may be.
If the legislation of a Contracting State grants two or more successive terms of
protection, the duration of the first term shall not be less than one of the minimum
period specified above.
UCC art. IV, ff 2.
68 See Report at 72-73 with respect to registration, and id. at 77 with respect to deposit
of copies.
09 See Strauss, 'Trotection of Unpublished Works," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 29,
supra note 26, at 31 (1957).
70 Arpad Bogsch, Attorney-Adviser of the Copyright Office, who acted as Secretary of the
UNESCO Geneva Conference at which the UCC was adopted in 1952 and who was associated
with the Copyright Division of UNESCO from 1948 to 1954, has written with respect to the
third subparagraph of UCC art. IV, § 2 [see note 67, supra]:
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States would be "entitled" to establish for such works a minimum term
which would not expire until twenty-five years from their first publica-
tion (or registration before first publication) at a later time,71 although
the establishment of this minimum would apparently not be required.
If it were deemed contrary to the spirit of UCC for the United
States not to be bound by any minimum term for unpublished works
where there is no measuring life, the revised act could adopt the minimum
which it is "entitled" to adopt. This would mean that the base point for
the computation of such minimum term would be set at the publication
or prior registration of the work. Because of the possibility that the work
in question may in fact never be registered or "published the "limited
times" requirement73 of the Constitution, might create a problem.74 But
the apparent conflict between the requirements of the UCC and the Con-
stitution could perhaps be resolved by utilizing a conclusive statutory
presumption: a work created by an author other than a natural person
would be deemed to have been published at the expiration of a specified
period of great length after its creation, for example, fifty75 years, unless
prior to such time actual publication occurred. If the presumption of pub-
lication after fifty years were adopted in the Act, the term would continue
for twenty-five years from the first publication (presumed or actual) or
seventy-five years from creation, whichever were longer. The constitu-
tional requirement would thus be fulfilled in that the maximum term of
protection for the works of a corporate author would be seventy-five
years.
As to unpublished works which are not registered prior to their publication the
Convention does not contain a minimum.This is an anomaly, since there is no reason
to prescribe minima for unpublished works in the case of all countries where duration
is based (for one or more or all classes of works) on the life of the author, and not to
prescribe minima for unregistered unpublished works in the case of countries like the
United States and the Philippines. According to the law prevailing today in the United
States, this anomaly has, of course, no practical ill effects, because the protection of
unpublished works in which a claim to copyright has not been registered is governed by
the common law and is limitless in time. Consequently, it is longer than any conceivable
limited term. Technically, however, there is a gap in the Convention which should be
filled in a future revision.
Bogsch, Universal Copyright Convention 58 (1958).
71 UCC art. IV, § 2, quoted at note 67, supra.
2 It should be noted that the UCC definition of "publication" requires "reproduction in
tangible form and the general distribution to the public of copies of a work from which it
can be read or otherwise visually perceived." Art. VI. Thus, in this context the revised act
cannot substitute the broader concept of "public dissemination" (e.g., by broadcasting) for
"publication" as the event which commences the running of the minimum term. See note 134,
infra.
73 See note 31, supra.
74 But it should be noted that Congress seems to have recognized no constitutional
infirmity to providing remedies, apparently without limitation of time, for infringement of
unpublished works under the federal acts prior to 1909. See e.g., Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15,
§ 6, 1 Stat. 124, 125; Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 9, 4 Stat. 436, 438; Act of July 8, 1870,
ch. 230, § 102, 16 Stat. 198, 215; Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 9, 26 Stat. 1106, 1109.
75 See text at note 107, infra.
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A resolution of this apparent conflict might be made with respect
to the works of anonymous and pseudonymous authors by adopting a
similar presumption: for such works the author would be' deemed to have
died twenty-five years after the creation" of the work, unless prior to
such "death" or the expiration of, for example, fifty77 years thereafter,
the author is identified. If the presumption of death after twenty-five
years were adopted in the act, the term would continue for fifty years
from the author's death (presumed or, where the author has become
identified, actual)s78 Alternatively, where an anonymous or pseudonymous
work is published or registered during its term of copyright (i.e., prior
to fifty years after the author's presumed death), the statute could limit
the period of protection to any fixed period of twenty-five years or more
from such publication or registration.
2. The constitutional requirement of due process.79 Where a work
has already been created and exists in unpublished form, a problem arises
as to whether the involuntary substitution of a statutory right for the
common law right of which the author is being divested does not deprive
him of his property without due process. Two questions must be an-
swered:80 First, is there a deprivation without due process with respect
to the extent of the rights and remedies involved? Second, is there a de-
privation without due process with respect to the duration of the term
of protection? Inasmuch as the rights and remedies, taken together,
which would be afforded to the owner of a work under the statutory
system appear to be no less favorable to the author than his corresponding
rights and remedies under the common law, the first question would ap-
pear to be answered satisfactorily in the negative. And a like answer
could be made to the second question if either of two alternative pro-
cedures were utilized by the revised act.
Under the first alternative, the common law rights could be continued
outside the act, presumably in perpetuity, for all unpublished and un-
registered works in existence at the effective date of the new act, subject
76 Admittedly, an evidentiary problem may be presented in determining the year of
creation of pseudonymous and anonymous works, but in view of the proportionately small
number of such works which have literary or commercial significance, this problem would
not seem to constitute a major objection to a system of copyright from creation.
77 See text at note 107, infra.
78 The United Kingdom Copyright Act of 1956 contains an analogous provision with
respect to such works, permitting the extension of the copyright term (when the author
becomes identifiable) to the full balance, if any, of the copyright term for an identified
author. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, Second Schedule, ff 2 [19561.
79 "No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const.
amend. V.
80 See discussion in Strauss, "Protection of Unpublished Works," Copyright Law Revision
Study No. 29, supra note 261 at 35 (1957).
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to divestiture only upon the occurrence of some elective act by the owner
(e.g., publication, registration, resort to federal courts, etc.)," by which
statutory copyright might be obtained. Under this alternative there is
the possibility of confusion at some later date as to the existence of a
given work at the effective date of the new Act. The number of works
of any significance whose status would be ambiguous, however, is likely to
be small, for probably few such works would not have come within the
ambit of the statute by one means or another.
Under the second alternative, common law rights would be abolished
as of the effective date of the statute, not only with respect to future
works but also with respect to works which are in existence but unpub-
lished and unregistered as of that date. The taking of such common
law rights, even though involuntary (unlike the elective procedure under
the first alternative), would be in exchange for statutory protection for a
reasonably long period of time. In theory such an "exchange," although
compulsory, complies with the requirements of due process: not only
would the limited statutory term granted to the owner be sufficiently
long to permit a reasonable opportunity to exploit the work, but the re-
duction from perpetuity82 to a limited time would be a provision neces-
sary and proper to fulfill the purpose of constitutionally valid legislation."
81 See the "Shotwell bill," S. 3043, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., § 45 (1933), which provided
for the election of statutory copyright by any one of various acts, including publication,
registration, deposit, recordation of an assignment or other instrument pertaining to the
work, and commencement of an infringement action or proceeding.
82 In summarizing a contemporary trend in the law of unfair competition as it pertains
to literary and artistic property, Whicher, supra note 30 makes a strong argument that this
"perpetual" common law right is in fact not unlimited in time:
Between them ... Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized (though indirectly)
the power of the states to protect authors' common law property rights in published
literary and artistic works concurrently with the similar protections given to such works
by the federal copyright statute.
[Iln New York . . .at least, the INS [International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)] doctrine extends to all forms of commercially marketed
literary and artistic property ...
The most striking feature of this relatively new form of "unfair competition" is the
virtual identity of the right it enforces with the old, eighteenth-century conception of a
common law copyright in published works which Blackstone had set out in the
Commentaries [2 BL. COMM *405-07] and justices Willes, Aston, and Lord Mansfield
had defended with such vigor and brilliance in Millar v. Taylor [4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng.
Rep. 201 (1769)] .... [Algain like the old right, the new vne protects the author and
his successors only for as long as they actively market the work commercially: ... the
protection endures only for the commercially exploited life of his work .... [Tihis is
a very different thing from perpetual protection. Because of this limitation, the new
common law right does not include (as the statutory right does) the power to withhold
a work, once published, from the market. ...
Id. at 219-20.
83 See Strauss, "Protection of Unpublished Works," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 29,
supra note 26, at 36 (1957). See also letter of Edward A. Sargoy, Esq., March 21, 1958
in Appendix to Strauss, supra, 45 at 46-48.
It should be noted that the Report, in recommending the abolition of the common law
right in manuscripts deposited in archives, Report, 42-43, discussed supra in text to notes
46 and 50-55, proposes a taking of the right without any "exchange" of statutory protection
for the common law right taken. Therefore, quaere, whether the mere availability of
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As Whicher 84 points out, it is perhaps necessary, if Congress is to
achieve a complete preemption of state common law protection of literary
and artistic property, that resort be made to its constitutional powers
under not only the copyright clause, but also under the commerce clause 5
as well. His theory is that the common law right in literary and artistic
property, which continues even after statutory copyright is secured, plays
its role in our courts sub noma. "unfair competition" (species, "Misappro-
priation"). Under this theory, the pre-emption of the common law right
can be achieved under the copyright clause "for limited times," but for
the pre-emption to be effective for a longer period (i.e., in perpetuo),
Congress would have to utilize constitutional powers under the commerce
clause, which are not circumscribed in time. Discussion of a federal unfair
competition statute86 is beyond the scope of this article, but if the revised
Copyright Act is to effect complete pre-emption of the state common
law right, attention should be given to the possible use of the powers




A. Inception of Copyright-the Alternatives and the Report's Recom-
mendation
There are three basic events which can generally be used to mark
the inception of statutory copyright:
88
statutory protection for such works, by voluntary registration, as recommended by the
Report, would be sufficient to afford due process.
84 See Whicher, supra note 30, at 227:
[Tihe developing state common law of "unfair competition," . . . [which] forbids
essentially uncreative appropriations of authors' expressions [i.e., "Chinese copying"]
and purely imitative appropriations of the non-functional features of inventors' dis-
coveries . . . operates in fields which, it is submitted, are beyond the scope of the dedi-
catory powers of Congress under the patent-copyright clause [i.e., U.S. Const. art. I, §
8), limited as those powers are to the realization of the objectives stated in the opening,
purposive phrase .of that clause.
This is not to say that Congress lacks power to preempt and "federalize" the entire
law of literary property. It is only to say that such a power cannot be distilled from
the patent-copyright clause alone. A preemptive federal law of "unfair competition" by
or in any transaction concerning literary or artistic property, which in any way affects
interstate commerce, would, when coupled with as preemptive a copyright statute as
Congress could enact, certainly clear the decks of state action in the field.
85 "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States... ." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
86 Such a bill is at this writing pending before Congress. S. 1036, H. R. 7833, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1961).
87 Report ch. V, at 45-58. For the general background, see Guinan, "Duration of Copy-
right," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 30, supra note 76, at 57(1957), and Ringer,
"Renewal of Copyright," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 31, Id. at 105 (1960).
88 Inception of copyright is not necessarily the point from which the term of copyright is
computed. For example, in those countries where copyright has its inception with the
creation of the work, the length of the term is generally computed from the author's date
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1. Creation of the work;
2. Registration or other formal act; 19 or
3. First public dissemination or "publication."
The present act provides for the inception of statutory copyright (as
opposed to the common law right)9" with the publication 91 of a work or
its registration 2 in the Copyright Office prior thereto. The copyright
endures for a period of twenty-eight years and may, during its last year,
be renewed for a further period of like duration."
In most foreign countries the copyright generally begins with the
creation of the work, and continues for a period measured by the life of
the author plus a term of years after the author's death. In the case of
jointly authored works, the term of years usually is computed from the
date of the death of the last survivor. In the case of corporate, anony-
mous, and posthumous works, however, the term is usually computed
from the date of publication and runs for a period of years equal to the
period subsequent to the death of an identifiable natural author.
The Report states three basic objections to the adoption of the
foreign system of copyright inception upon creation:94 (1) the evidentiary
problem in determining an author's date of death for use in ascertaining
the term, as opposed to the apparent ease in measuring the term from
the date shown on registration records or in published copies of the work;
(2) the lack of uniformity in establishing a general period of life plus a
term of years while at the same time establishing a period on some other
basis for corporate and anonymous works; and (3) the adjustment which
would be necessary in the practices of industries dealing with copy-
righted materials.
For the reasons stated, the Report rejects the system of copyright
from creation. It proposes instead that copyright commence with the
"first public dissemination" of a work, a term which would include regis-
tration of the work in the Copyright Office (if the creator chose to effect
registration) prior to its exploitation. 5 By implication the Report rejects
the use of registration or other formal act as the sole event which would
commence the copyright term. This rejection seems wise, in view of the
gap in statutory protection which would likely result in many instances
of death, in which case the copyright expires, e.g., fifty years after that date. See note 53,
supra. Under our present act, the length of the term is computed, however, from its incep-
tion at first publication or prior registration. See text at notes 91-93, infra.
89 See note 81, supra.
90 See text at notes 30 to 41, supra.
9' See 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1958).
92 See id. § 12.
93 Id. § 24.
94 Report, at 48-49.
95 See text at notes 37, 38, 42 and 44, supra.
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between the date a work is first exposed to the public and the date the
statutory protection would commence.
B. The Proposal for Copyright From "First Public Dissemination"
Compared With an Alternative Proposal of Copyright From Creation
As indicated above in connection with the discussion of protection
of unpublished works,9 the writer advocates that copyright commence
with the creation of the copyrightable work rather than with its "first
public dissemination." Some of the relative advantages of the former
system have already been discussed, 97 but let us focus here on the three
basic objections which the Report posits98 for its rejection of that system
and, inferentially, for its recommendation of the latter system.
1. The evidentiary problem. It is claimed that the date of death of
an author who is not well known might be difficult to determine, thus
rendering uncertain the termination date of his copyrights under a "life-
plus" system. For several reasons, however, this problem is not as great
as might appear. First, there is no need for concern about the precise
month and day of the author's demise, but only the year. Countries
utilizing the "life-plus" system customarily run the term of copyright
to the end of the calendar year in which the relevant anniversary (e.g.,
fiftieth) of the author's death occurs.99 Second, the obscure author has
become increasingly less obscure (i.e., with respect to his existence, not
necessarily his writings) in contemporary society, and his vital statistics
have become increasingly available to the public."' This is true even in
the case of an author whose works are of lesser artistic or commercial
value and hence less likely to be utilized after his death.'
Third, the revised act could reward the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence to ascertain the relevant facts by a would-be user of a work, and
could also contain inducements to the heirs or other successors in interest
96 See text at notes 49-63, supra.
97 Ibid.
98 See text at note 93, supra.
99 See, e.g., the United Kingdom Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 2(3) [1956], and
the 1948 (Brussels) version of the Berne Convention art. 7(6). It should be noted that under
the Report's proposals concerning term of copyright, all terms would also run to the end
of the calendar year in which they would otherwise expire. Report, at 56.
100 It is not inconceivable, for example, that the electronic marvels to be utilized by the
Internal Revenue Service in storing information on every taxpayer in the country could be
utilized to inform the Copyright Office of the year in which an author, because of his death,
ceased to file returns. See, e.g., a discussion of the Automatic Data Processing program by
the Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue: Harding, "New Directions-Automation and
Integrity," 40 Taxes 79 (1962). It would indeed be ironic if a copyright law revised to cope
with technological progress did not itself utilize the benefits of such progress.
101 It should be noted that the diligent research typical of the Copyright Office Studies
failed to unearth any published reports of significant difficulty in establishing the date of
the author's death in the countries of Western Europe employing the "life-plus" system,
although it was acknowledged that some such reports may exist. See Guinan, "Duration of
Copyright," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 30, supra note 26, 57 at 73 (1957).
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of a deceased author to record his date of death with the Copyright
Office.102 Under such a statutory arrangement, the user would evidence
his diligence by checking the records of the Copyright Office and, if the
date of the author's death were not contained in such records, by checking
with the author's publisher or in the standard biographical listings. The
owners of a copyright after the author's death could then be denied the
remedy of statutory damages if the date of the author's death had not
been recorded in the Copyright Office within a specified period after that
date (or, alternatively, at any time prior to the commencement of an
infringement) and the defendant showed that he had exercised reasonable
diligence in trying to ascertain the necessary information. The court
could be required, in determining the user's diligence, to take into account
the evidentiary value afforded the defendant by the year date in any copy-
right notice appearing on a copy of the work to which the defendant had
access.
The evidentiary problems inherent in computing the term from first
public dissemination, as recommended by the Report, are probably
greater than those to be encountered in commencing the term with crea-
tion of the work. The first network telecast of a play written for television
or the first public exhibition of a blockbuster motion picture are likely to
be recorded amply, but neither the evanescent memory of man nor his
records are likely to retain the date of the first reading of a poem on a
local radio station, the first performance of a song at a summer resort,
the first performance of a play in summer stock or the first sneak preview
of a low-budget second feature. Moreover, the year date in the copyright
notice on a published copy of the work would not, under the Report's
recommendation, be that of first public dissemination but rather of first
publication. 3 The date in the notice would thus provide only an estimate
of the date when a work would enter the public domain.' 04 The informa-
102 It is also possible to utilize inducements to insert helpful information in the copyright
notice. See note 104 infra, and note 313 infra and text thereto.
103 Report, at 66.
104 It is true that under the Report's recommendations, one could probably assume that a
work bearing a notice with a year date more than seventy-six years old is in the public
domain, but where the date is more recent the work might enter the public domain at any
one of many points in time, e.g.: twenty-eight years from the first publication date (if
publication constituted its first public dissemination and the copyright were not renewed) ;
seventy-six years therefrom (assuming the same facts but renewal of the copyright); ten
years from the publication date (assuming either (1) first public dissemination eighteen years
prior to first publication, followed by no renewal, or (2) first public dissemination sixty-six
years prior to first publication, followed by renewal) ; etc.
For works other than those of foreign nationals protected under the UCC, the revised act
could require-and for all works, advantages such as statutory damages could be offered to
induce-the insertion of a legend or symbol in the copyright notice on published works to
indicate that the author is alive at the time of first publication. See note 313 infra, and
text thereto. Accordingly, quaere, whether it is of any greater value to be able to ascertain
that a work is in the publit domain because more than seventy-six years have elapsed from
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tion to be obtained from a copyright notice is therefore not a significant
consideration in evaluating whether copyright should begin with creation
or with dissemination. Also, since registration would continue to be op-
tional (except as a condition precedent to renewal or institution of suit)
under the Report's proposal, 10 5 the evidentiary value of registration is
likewise not a significant consideration.
2. The lack of uniformity under a "life-plus" system between the
terms for works of identified natural authors and those of others. The
Report objects that a general system of life plus a term of years for
natural authors would require separately computed terms for the works
of corporate authors and joint authors as well as for anonymous authors.
However, in view of the advantages otherwise to be obtained from the
"life-plus" system, this objection is not a serious one. For example, for
corporate works (and those of other legal entities), the term to be pre-
scribed under the revised act could be set at fifty years (if such is to be
the term after the death of a natural author) plus a period equal to the
average span of years during which a natural author enjoys copyright
during his lifetime.
This span would be the average span between the median age of
natural authors at the dates of publication of their works and their aver-
age age at death. Extrapolating from the statistics of the survey con-
ducted by the staff of the Copyright Office,' this average span is now
approximately twenty-five years. Adding this twenty-five year period
to the term of fifty years described above, a flat term of seventy-five
years from the date of creation of corporate works is obtained, 10 7 as
compared with a term of life plus fifty years for the works of identified
individual authors. As already suggested,08 the term for anonymous
works would also be seventy-five years. For jointly-authored works, there
is little need to alter the system customarily adopted in Berne Convention
countries: calculation of the term from the date of the death of the last
surviving author. 09
3. The adjustment to new concepts required if a "life-plus" term is
the date of first publication than to know that the work is not in the public domain because
less than fifty years have passed from that date.
105 See Report, at 76.
106 See id., at 50; 64 Ann. Rep. Reg. of Copyrights 3-5 (1961).
107 The relevant American obligations under the UCC and the constitutional requirements
in this context have been discussed in text at notes 72-75, supra.
108 See text at notes 76-78, supra.
109 See, e.g., the United Kingdom Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, Third Schedule, 1 2
[1956) and the 1948 (Brussels) version of the Berne Convention art. 7 his.
It should be noted, however, that in the United States joint authorship is more broadly
defined than under most foreign laws. See Cary, infra note 362 at 102-04. Jointly-authored
works may therefore be a more significant factor in evaluating the merits of a "life-plus"
system for the United States.
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adopted. As an objection to the measurement of the term from the au-
thor's death, the Report states that a much greater adjustment would be
necessary in business practices if the term were so computed rather than
computed from the first public dissemination. That such an adjustment
would be so great, however, as to make the adoption of this system un-
desirable is, at the very least, doubtful. For example, in the comments and
views submitted to the Copyright Office on its study concerning duration,
it is significant that among those persons favoring the life-plus system
were experts, speaking either for themselves or their professional or trade
groups, who have had considerable experience in the representation of
the interests of authors, composers, book publishers, motion picture com-
panies, and music publishers."' The matter is thus one of opinion. On
balance, my opinion is that the modification in business practices neces-
sary to accommodate a change to the "life-plus" system poses no sig-
nificant obstacle to its adoption.
C. The Renewal System-the Report's Proposal and the Problems
Under the renewal system provided in the present act,"' if the
author has died prior to the time for renewing the copyright, the renewal
right vests in the author's widow (or widower) and children. If there
be none of this class still living, then the renewal vests in the author's
executors; and in the absence of a will (assuming none of the first class
is still alive), the renewal vests in the author's next of kin. The renewal
right in works posthumously published and works made for hire vests
in the proprietor at the time of renewal.
After weighing the results of the Copyright Office study of the lon-
gevity of creators,"' the Report concludes that the present maximum
term of fifty-six years (twenty-eight years each for the original and re-
newal terms) is too short a period of time to permit the author and the
dependents of a deceased author adequate enjoyment of the benefits of
copyright. It therefore advocates a maximum period of seventy-six
years from the first public dissemination of a work, a period which
would be roughly equivalent to the term of life plus fifty years granted
in the major foreign countries." 3 On the premise, however, that the
maximum term of copyright is neither necessary nor advisable for all
works, the Report advocates the continuation of a renewal system of
110 In essence, nine out of the sixteen persons who transmitted their views to the Copy-
right Office favored the "life-plus" system. The views were for the most part tentative,
subject to reconsideration during the continuing discussion of the revision program. See
Appendix to Guinan, supra note 101 at 87 et seq.
311 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1958).
112 Report, at 50; 64 Ann. Rep. Reg. of Copyrights 3-5 (1961).
13 Id. at 51.
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copyright. In essence, it recommends that an original term be granted
for twenty-eight years from the date of first public dissemination and a
succeeding renewal term for forty-eight years, a total of seventy-six
years.
114
The Report cites as an advantage of the renewal system the fresh
record which renewal registration affords as to the copyright ownership
after a lapse of many years."' It is true that the Copyright Office renewal
record frequently provides a starting point for one searching for the
owner of a copyright which has been renewed. It is also true, however,
that the nature of the present renewal system limits the extent to which
the renewal record can assist the searcher;-"6 and in fact one of the recom-
mendations which the Report makes for liberalizing the present renewal
system 17 would make the renewal record even more limited in its assist-
ance to the searcher.
The Report, although favoring a renewable term, recognizes two
major objections to it:" 8 (1) the imposition on authors and other renewal
claimants of a burden (which the opponents of the renewal system claim
is a needless burden) of filing a renewal application; and (2) the risk
to such claimants of the loss of their copyrights by reason of an inad-
vertent failure to file the renewal application within the appropriate time.
In answer to the first objection, the Report cites, as evidence that
the maximum term is not "needed" for most works, the recent Copy-
right Office statistics to the effect that less than fifteen percent of all
registered copyrights are being renewed: approximately seventy per cent
of motion picture copyrights, thirty-five per cent of music copyrights,
eleven per cent of periodicals and seven per cent of "books.""' 9 The
Report argues, moreover, that "there are many circumstances in which
copyright restrictions inhibit the dissemination of works or their use
114 Id. at 53.
115 Id. at 52.
116 Cf. Ringer, "Renewal of Copyright," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 31, supra
note 26, at 105, 188 et seq. (1960):
As a registration formality, the usefulness of renewal in leading to the true owner of
the second term is sharply limited by two possibilities: that the renewal term may have
been assigned, or that there may be others in the same class of renewal claimants.
117 We propose that the law simply provide for the extension of the first 28-year period
to the maximum term upon the filing of a renewal application by any person claiming,
an interest in the copyright. This is in contrast with the present law, under which the
copyright can be renewed only in the name of the particular claimant specified in the
statute. Our proposal would mean that the renewal becomes a mere extension of term
without affecting ownership of rights under existing contracts. Any person claiming
an interest in the copyright-author, executor, heir, employer, assignee, licensee, etc.-
could make renewal registration.... Report, at 54.
118 Id. at 52.
119 Id. at 51. The figures in the Report are apparently based on the study set forth in
Appendix C to Ringer, "Renewal of Copyright," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 31, supra
note 26, at 105, 220 et seq. (1960).
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in the creation of new works" and that many works which no longer
have substantial commercial value (and hence, presumably, do not need
copyright protection) remain useful to scholars and educators as well
as authors of new works based on such pre-existing works. 120 The Re-
port's argument is perhaps summarized in its statement that "when
authors or other copyright owners feel that they have no need for a
longer term, the termination of copyright restrictions after twenty-eight
years is in the public interest."'
2 '
The Report attempts to answer the objection concerning the danger
of inadvertent failure to renew by suggesting that the revised act should
permit the filing of renewal applications during the last five of the initial
twenty-eight years,'12 2 instead of the last year, as provided in the pres-
ent act.
In the writer's view, however, to retain the system of original and
renewal terms of copyright in the new act would be losing a golden
opportunity to remove one of the most troublesome provisions of the
present act. The suggestions made for lengthening the period for renew-
ing from one to five years, for lengthening the renewal period itself
from twenty-eight to forty-eight years and for the elimination of the
reversion of renewal rights to the author or specified heirs'2 3 would all
ameliorate some of the present difficulties but the essence of the problem
would remain: the renewal system would continue to be an unjustified
burden on the owners of copyright.
While it may be true that the termination of copyright after twenty-
eight years is in the public interest where the copyright owner deliberately
decides not to renew it, this view begs the question as to renewal deci-
sions. The writer's experience is that most copyrights-certainly most of
those that still have value after twenty-eight years-which fail of renewal
do so inadvertently. The, failure to file a renewal application is almost
never the result of a conscious decision on the part of the copyright
proprietor to let the work go into the public domain. In most cases he
would be foolish to make such a decision. It may be, for example, that
a work is not being exploited at the time the expiration of the original
term of copyright approaches, yet the value of the work may be revived
by the subsequent development of new media. This has happened with
120 Report, at 52.
121 Ibid.
122 Id. at 53.
123 Report, at 46.
As Dointed out by the Report, at 54, the reversionary feature is frequently confused with the
renewal system itself, and objections to the renewal system are made for the wrong reasons.
As indicated in the text, however, the writer is of the opinion that the renewal system is
unwise even without the reversionary feature. See note 132, infra.
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respect to television and may also happen with respect to pay-television
and new media still unknown.
If in fact a use broader than a "fair use" is to be made of a work
during the forty-eight years after the expiration of the original term,
the copyright proprietor (i.e., the person who would have owned the
exclusive rights had the copyright been renewed) should benefit from
such use. Put most simply, if the property is valuable enough to be used,
the author should profit from the use. Although in some cases a user
would not exploit a particular property if it were protected by copyright
and a royalty payment were necessitated, the importance and the cer-
tainty of long-term copyright protection in encouraging the creation and
dissemination of intellectual and artistic contributions outweighs the
value of providing an additional body of public domain material for roy-
alty-free adaptation and performance by others.
It is doubtful that giving copyright proprietors five years, instead of
the present one year, in which to renew will work a transmogrification of
the renewal system into a socially valuable mechanism for making avail-
able to many the works no longer desired by the few. On the contrary,
the unwary will still fail to renew, while the wary will still renew indis-
criminately. And in fact indiscriminate renewal will be easier for those
who are better-equipped, for electronic data processing devices in the
hands of large creators and users (or their professional or industry
groups, or third parties undertaking to serve them) may be able to
process the entire renewal application automatically.
Thus, those who may be placed at a disadvantage under a con-
tinuation of the renewal system would likely be the less consequential
creators and users who do not retain copyright counsel to advise them
of the needless intricacies of the Copyright act. The reductio ad absurdum
of such a system is the imposition on a poet or photographer, or his heirs,
of the never-ending, time-consuming and expensive job of seeing to it
that hundreds or thousands of his individual works are renewed.
The Report's approach has perhaps been influenced by the Trade-
mark Act,' under which, to retain the initial registration an affidavit
of use must be filed in the sixth year thereafter 5 and a renewal appli-
cation must be filed every twenty years for the same purpose. 26 Rights
in a trademark, however, are merely the results of user; and the registration
evidences such result. The mere failure to renew a trademark registra-
124 Trademark Act of 1946, as amended, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127
(1958).
12 Id. at § 8, 15 U.S.C. at § 1058 (1958).
126 Id. at § 9, 15 U.S.C. at § 1059 (1958).
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tion does not impair the owner's rights in the mark itself. Inasmuch as
the trademark does not give the owner any exclusivity to deal in the
product to which it is affixed but only the exclusive right to say that his
product is his product, the registration can properly continue in perpetuo
so long as the public identifies the owner as the source or origin of the
product bearing his mark.
The exclusive rights under a copyright, however, are not the result
of user but a grant which the Constitution has empowered Congress to
make. Congress may of course impose an obligation to renew the copy.
right in order to retain the exclusive rights, but the writer submits that
a copyright owner should not be required to take affirmative action in
order to preserve his exclusive rights for the maximum period.
D. The Reversion of Renewal Copyright
As we have already seen, 27 the present act provides that successive
classes of persons have the right to renew an author's copyright if he
is not alive at the time for renewing. However, not only do persons have
the right to renew but the ownership of the renewal copyright reverts
to them in such case, thus defeating any license or assignment which the
author may have made with respect to the renewal term prior to his
death. 28 Although the reversion of the renewal term was intended to
give the author and his family the benefit of a second chance in the event
of an improvident bargain with respect to his original term of copy-
right,12 9 the author frequently grants rights in the renewal copyright at
the time of the grant under the original term; and if the author is alive
at the time of renewal, his earlier grant of rights in the second term is
binding.' 30
The reversionary feature has compounded the difficulties inherent
in our system of renewal copyright without fulfilling the paternalistic aim
of Congress. The Report is rightly critical of this feature which it states
has been "the source of more confusion and litigation than any other
127 See text atnote 111, supra.
128 Miller Music Corp. v. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
129 See, e.g., the report accompanying the Smoot-Currier bill, which became the 1909 act:
It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a publisher
for a comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be a great success and lives
beyond the term of twenty-eight years, your committee felt that it should be the exclu-
sive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should be framed as is
the existing law, so that he could not be deprived of that right.
H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909).
130 Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
The Fisher case and the Miller case, supra note 128, comprise an inadequate sampling of
the extensive litigation which has arisen concerning the reversion and other features of the
United States renewal system. For an exhaustive discussion of these cases see Ringer, supra
note 116, at 124-87.
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provision in the copyright law."'31 To avoid these difficulties, it recom-
mends that the renewal system in the revised act should delete the auto-
matic reversion of the renewal term.
132
E. The Application of the UCC to the Proposed Renewal system
The Universal Copyright Convention, of which the United States
is a member, requires that, where the term of protection for Convention
work is computed from the date of a work's first publication or prior
registration, a minimum term of at least twenty-five years from the date
of first publication or prior registration, as the case may be, must be
provided.' 33 Because the Report recommends a term of copyright com-
mencing with a work's "first public dissemination,"'1 34 it recommends
a further provision for a separate minimum term which would run from
the work's first publication. 135 Under this provision, if a work is first
disseminated otherwise than by publication and is later published before
the first twenty-eight year term expires, the term would continue for at
least twenty-eight years after first publication.'36
In other words, where a work is copyrighted upon its first public
dissemination other than by publication, and is later published during the
first twenty-eight year term, the dates of each of these two events as
well as the date of the renewal of the copyright would be of possible
significance to a prospective user seeking to determine the copyright
status of the work.
If in fact there is to be a renewal system under the revised act,
this further recommendation appears to be a reasonable reconciliation
with the requirements of the Universal Copyright Convention. However,
the system of twenty-eight and forty-eight year terms or, more precisely,
the twenty-eight and forty-eight year system with a separate twenty-eight
year term to overlap the other two, is likely to create confusion in the
131 Report, at 53.
132 In summarizing the arguments for elimination of the reversion, the Report states:
"The widespread sentiment for elimination of the present renewal system seems to be
prompted largely by the welter of confusion and uncertainty caused by the reversionary
provision." Id. at 54. The writer respectfully submits that irrespective of the basis for
such "sentiment," substantial reason appears for the elimination of even a non-reversionary
renewal system. An attempt has been made, in section B of the text, to set forth the non-
sentimental objections to the renewal system per se.
It should be noted that although the Report favors eliminating the reversion of renewals,
it has proposed instead an analogous reversion, after twenty years, of rights granted under
lump-sum transfers. See Report, at 94.
133 UCC art. IV, ff 2, third subparagraph, quoted in note 67, supra.
134 Under the Report's recommendation, publication or registration would be forms of
"public dissemination," but alternative forms would include public performance or the
public distribution of sound recordings. Report, at 41. Neither of these alternative forms
would constitute "publication" under the UCC. See note 37, supra.
135 Report, at 55.
136 If the copyright on such a work were renewed, the term would endure for a total term
of seventy-six years, regardless of the date of first publication.
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minds of both creators and users. In evaluating the merit of a proposal
for legislation, its complexity must be weighed against the likely result
when those whom the legislation purports to benefit attempt to guide
themselves under it. 3 ' If there were no renewal system, the provision
just described would be unnecessary. 3 "
F. The Application of the New Term Proposals to Pre-Existing Works
With respect to pre-existing copyrights, two significant questions
arise under the Report's proposals: Inasmuch as the Report recommends
the elimination of the automatic reversion of the renewal term to the
author or other specified persons, who is to own the future renewal term
of a copyright in its original term at the effective date of the new act?
And secondly, where renewal rights have already been granted by the
owner prior to the effective date of the new act, who is to have the benefit
of the copyright for the lengthened renewal term of forty-eight years (as
opposed to the present renewal term of twenty-eight years)-the grantor
or the grantee? As for the first question, the Report recognizes the un-
fairness of cutting off the expectancies of heirs and others concerning
future renewals of existing copyrights under the present system of rever-
sion. Accordingly, it wisely recommends that the automatic reversion of
renewal rights should continue in effect for those copyrights not yet re-
newed as of the effective date of the new act.' 39
In approaching the problem posed by the second question, the Re-
port enters the area in which some of the greatest conflicts between
creators and users have occurred in past efforts at copyright law revi-
sion.140 The Report states as its premise that although the interests of
the grantees must be considered, "there would be little justification for
13-7 Obfuscation may be permitted to creators as free poetic license. Cf. Cummings, Poems
1923-1954 at p. 331 (1954): "The poems to come are for you and for me and are not for
mostpeople. . . ." Clarity, however, should be a mandate to those charged with the assign-
ment of drafting a new Copyright Act, which must, so far as possible, be understandable to
"mostpeople" and not to copyright lawyers alone.
138 A computation of a single term of years from first public dissemination would like-
wise require an alternative computation of minimum term (from first publication) in order
to comply with the UCC. Such a computation would also be complicated; but adding the
complexity of the renewal system to that of the alternative term required by the UCC piles
Ossa on Pelion.
139 Report, at 57.
140 See Ringer, supra note 116, at 202, in summarizing the legislative proposals since 1909
affecting renewals:
The transitory provision dealing with the extension of subsisting copyrights turned out
to be one of the most troublesome and difficult problems facing the revision drafters,
and no completely satisfactory solution was ever found. Everyone appeared to agree
that, at least nominally, the extension bad to be given to the author or his family, but
there was considerable pressure to allow previous grantees to share in the extension.
There was also some feeling that, rather than face all these problems, it would be better
not to extend subsisting copyrights at all.
For a detailed discussion of these legislative proposals, see id. at 191-202.
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lengthening the term unless the author or his heirs were to receive some
benefit from it."'' The Report attempts to reconcile these conflicting
interests by proposing that if the assignee has a continuing obligation
to the author or his heirs to pay a royalty or a portion of the revenue
derived from the copyright, the assignment should remain effective for
the additional twenty years; but if the grant was made for a lump sum
payment, the copyright should revert to the author or his heirs for the
extended twenty-year period even though the grant may explicitly have
included "any extensions" of copyright.
42
Let us acknowledge first that there is no easy answer to this question,
for no legislative disposition of the rights in the extension of term for
existing works will please everyone. Nor need any such disposition
please everyone, for the prime purpose of copyright legislation is not
to please, but to promote the progress of science and useful arts. The
practicalities of the legislative process, however, would indicate that
substantial opposition to any important provision in a proposed bill
may impair the likelihood of the bill's passage. 43
The denial of the benefits of an extended term to a grantee under
a lump-sum grant which explicitly includes rights in "any extensions"
appears, at the very least,'44 an unfair modification of a contract already
made. The contract should govern, and the rights in the extension should
be disposed of as the contract provides. On the other hand, where there
is in fact a continuing arrangement for the copyright owner to receive
a royalty or portion of the revenue from the work, there should be little
argument against the grantee continuing to exercise the rights granted.
The core of the problem, however, would appear to be the lump-sum
grant which does not refer to the period of "any extensions" of copyright.
The core contains two seeds of controversy: (1) what is a "lump-sum"
grant? and (2) should the grantor or the grantee under such a grant
obtain the benefit of the extension?
The answer to the first question weighs heavily in determining the
answer to the second question, for there is a large gray area in the per-
mutations and combinations of contractual arrangements where the grant
can with no great assurance be classified as either "lump-sum" or "con-
tinuing payment."'M4 A contract may specify that the grantor is to
141 Report, at 58.
142 Ibid.
143 See note 140, supra.
144 Possibly there may also be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against the
taking of property without due process. A full discussion of this problem is beyond the scope
of this article, but for a discussion of the similar due process question in connection with
abolition of common law literary property rights, see text to notes 79-83 supra, and refer-
ences cited in those notes, including Strauss, supra note 83, at 34-36.
145 See text at note 379, infra.
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receive a sum certain on signing with a further sum certain on the hap-
pening of any various contingencies (revenues in excess of a specified
amount; grant of rights to the work in another medium; exploitation
of the rights beyond a specified point in time; etc.). The grant may
instead provide that the grantor is to receive a minimum of a sum certain
at regular intervals, plus an additional sum at each interval if the reve-
nues exceed a specified amount. The grantee may have a right to pay the
grantor a fixed sum in lieu of any continuing royalties. And so on. The
variety of such arrangements reflects both the complexity of our business
and tax practices and the ingenuity of our legal minds.
Under the Report's proposal each of the contractual arrangements
would have to be classified as either "lump-sum" or "continuing roy-
alty." It is not clear whether a minimum continuing royalty would be
specified. This would be most difficult for the legislative draftsman to
formulate, but no more difficult than the onus upon the attorney who
must determine whether or not the grantor or the grantee has the rights
in a given work for the extended period of copyright. Thus, the require-
ment that the extended term revert to the grantor under a "lump-sum"
grant would present substantial problems of contract interpretation.
Turning now from the administrative question to that of substance,
it is proper that the grantor should, if it is feasible, obtain benefits
from the extension of term.'46 There are, however, frequent instances
in which a lump sum payment has fairly compensated the author and
his heirs for whatever use the grantee may make of the copyright for the
entire period of the renewal copyright, including the twenty-year exten-
sion. Moreover, the grantee may have made a substantial investment in,
for example, a motion picture which is based on an underlying work the
exclusive rights in which the motion picture producer was led to believe
were his. The producer's investment was thus premised on the assump-
tion that he would be free from any restraint on the exhibition of his
motion picture both during and after the present term of copyright on
the underlying work. The automatic reversion of the extended term,
146 See Ringer, supra note 116, at 205:
.. [P]rovisions aimed at adjusting the length of the copyright term in a variety of
situations are increasingly common in the copyright statutes of other countries. Even
more striking are the provisions intended to help preserve and maintain the author's
personal and economic rights as against transferees and users, or to give him and his
family a "second chance" to benefit from his work. These provisions are extremely
common and growing more so: both the scope of these provisions, and the particularity
with which they are set out, also appear to be increasing. It is probably no exaggeration
to call the growth in provisions regulating an author's contract relations the most im-
portant recent development in world copyright law.
See also the recommendation made by the Report for a general limitation on the term of
lump-sum transfers to twenty years from the date of execution. Report, at 94, discussed in
text to notes 373-79, infra.
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however, would require the producer to obtain a further grant from the
grantor.
Somewhat the same issues are presented by the joint resolution which
was introduced by Representative Celler on February 15, 1962, to con-
tinue until December 31, 1967, any subsisting renewal term of copyright
which would otherwise expire prior to that date. 4 In essence, the length-
ening of the term under either the recommendation of the Report or the
pending joint resolution constitutes a windfall. Thus, the question is
whether the wisest course is to grant the benefits of the windfall
to the author and his heirs, to grant the benefits to the user or to avoid any
windfall at all by permitting renewal copyrights to expire on the dates
dictated by the provisions of the present act. 48 There is no easy solution,





A. General Standards of Copyrightability
1. "Writings." The present act states: "The works for which copyright
may be secured under this title shall include all the writings of an
author." 150 Not merely do copyrightable works include "all the writings
of an author," as stated in the statute, but the Constitution requires that
a work must be a "writing" if it is to be protected. 5' The Report there-
fore recommends that the statute should mention a general requirement
that any work, in order to be copyrightable, must be fixed in some tang-
ble form. 2 It would also seem advisable to use the specific phrase
"tangible form," in view of the use of that phrase in the definition of
"publication" in the Universal Copyright Convention. 5 3
2. Originality and creativity. The Report also recommends that the
147 H.J. Res. 627, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). S.J. Res. 178 and S.J. Res. 182 were
introduced in the same Session by Sen. Kefauver on April 2, and May 2, 1962, respectively.
Inasmuch as the revised act will in all likelihood provide in some manner for a longer term,
the various bills provide interim measures for saving the benefits of the new act for those
renewal copyrights about to expire. S.J. Res. 182 is identical with H.J. Res. 627. S.J. Res.
178, however, would limit the period of the continuation to "the date of enactment into
law of a general revision of the copyright laws" if such enactment occurs prior to December
31, 1967.
148 See note 140, supra.
149 Report ch. II, at 7-18. For the general background, see Derenberg et al., "The
Meaning of 'Writings' in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution," 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 334
(1956), reprinted as Copyright Law Revision Study No. 3, supra note 26, at 61 (1956).
150 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
151 See note 31 supra. Cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 210 (1954); Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corp., 221 F.2d 657, at 664 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
152 Report, at 9-10.
,153 See note 72 supra.
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new act set forth two further pre-requisites for copyrightability, neither
of which is explicit in the present act: originality and creativity. "Orig-
inality" means that the work was created by the author himself and was
)aot copied from the work of another. If an isolated genius who had never
had access to the works of Shakespeare were to create Hamlet anew,
theoretically he would have a copyrightable work even though his work
were a replica, word for word, of the earlier work of Shakespeare.
"Originality" is thus not "novelty." An invention to be patentable, must
be "novel," in the sense that it has not been disclosed in the prior art.
54
A work to be copyrightable must be original, but need not be novel.'55 As
for the second suggested prerequisite, the cases do indeed state that at
least a modicum of creative authorship is necessary for copyrightabil-
ity.156 When the proposed statute is actually drafted, however, I submit
that the draftsmen should phrase the requirement of creativity so that it
does not appear that either the Register of Copyrights or the courts are
to be appointed as arbiters of literary and artistic taste. The wisdom
required to assess the "creativity" of blank forms 57 or circus posters'
58
is as nothing compared to the Solomonic talent required to enter con-
troversy as to whether a given example of modern painting, sculpture,
poetry or music does or does not represent an appreciable amount of
creative authorship.
B. Classification of Copyrightable Works
The present act states in section 5 that the. application for registration
must specify which of certain designated classes the work in which copy-
right is claimed belongs. 59 Section 5 also states, however, that this classi-
fication "shall not be held to limit the subject matter of copyright" as
defined in section 4.160 Inasmuch as section 4 states that copyrightable
works under the act "include all the writings of an author," it might be
assumed that any "writing" would be copyrightable, whether or not
among the classes designated in section 5.161 Such an assumption,
154 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1958).
155 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
Forstmann Woolen Co. v. J. W. Mays, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.Y. 1950). But cf.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
157 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). But cf. Continental Casualty Co. v. Beards-
ley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied., 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
158 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., supra note 156.
-19 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
160 See text accompanying note 150, supra.
161 The following classes are designated:
(a) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, directories, gazetteers, and
other compilations.
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers.
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses (prepared for oral delivery).
(d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions.
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however, is not warranted.162 The question thus arises whether the re-
vised act should more specifically express an intent of Congress to grant
copyright protection to the full range of works which may be eligible for
such protection under the Constitution.
The Report recommends that Congress not do so but instead set forth
the specific classes of works to be copyrightable under the new act.163
The Report further suggests that the specification by Congress should
include all of the classes presently set forth in section 5 of the act and
such others as Congress may now deem appropriate. This classification
would, however, be set forth broadly in order to permit the inclusion in
these general categories of similar works in new forms or media which
may be developed. The Report takes the position that delimiting the
classes of eligible works in this manner is preferable to the automatic
inclusion of every work which may be eligible under the Constitution, and
cites typography, broadcast emissions and industrial designs as examples
of the sort of works constitutionally eligible but which Congress would
probably not want to protect under the copyright statute.164
There is merit in the Report's position that "the extension of the
copyright statute to entirely new areas of subject matter should be left
to the determination of Congress rather than to the chance interpretation
of an omnibus provision."'6 5 But if a revision of the act is achieved, it
will have-taken Congress more than half a century to bring the act into
alignment with current technology. In the interim, the burden has fallen
upon the courts to protect creators of new forms of works by narrowing
this Congressional equivalent of "cultural lag." In the light of past ex-
perience, therefore, only the most sanguine would feel confident that
Congress would amend the Copyright Act with sufficient frequency in the
future to accommodate its provisions to the rapid changes of technology.
The Report appears to recommend that the Congressional classification
(e) Musical compositions.
(f) Maps.
(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art.
(h) Reproductions of a work of art.
(i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character.
(j) Photographs.
(k) Prints and pictorial illustrations including prints or labels used for articles of
merchandise.
(1) Motion-picture photoplays.
(m) Motion pictures other than photoplays.
17 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
162 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955)
holding that although under the Constitution Congress could give to one who performs a
public domain musical composition the exclusive right to make and vend phonograph records
of that rendition, Congress had not done so under the act.
163 Report, at 11-12.




of copyrightable works under the new act should be set forth more
broadly than under the present act. If this approach is to be adopted
(rather than granting statutory protection to all works constitutionally
eligible), a thorough study should first be made of the various new forms
of works which are presently known although perhaps not yet of the
same commercial significance as older forms. 166 Only after such a study
has been made should the legislative draftsmen prepare a classification
of the works eligible for protection under the new act.
C. Copyrightability of Specific Works
1. Works of applied art. The statuette of a Bali dancer was responsible
for the leading case of Mazer v. Stein,'67 in which the United States
Supreme Court held that the incorporation of the statuette into a lamp
base did not deprive it of its protection as a work of art. Since that time
the scope of protection which should be given to the designs of useful
articles has become a question of growing significance.'68 The Report
recommends' 69 that where a work of art (including pictorial, graphic
and sculptural works) is employed as a design or decoration of a useful
article, the work of art should continue to be protectible under the Copy-
right Act, but that the design of a useful article per se should be protected
under a sui generis design statute. Such a design statute would govern
protection of the design of useful articles such as automobiles, sewing
machines, wearing apparel, etc.
The Report points out that many of the customary features of the
copyright statute are inappropriate for the protection of the design of
useful articles per se .1' The term of copyright is probably much too
long for the protection of industrial designs, and the necessary statutory
provisions with respect to notice, deposit, registration and liability of
certain innocent infringers must be based on different considerations
under a copyright statute than under a design statute.'
7 '
166 The writer has in mind such "works" as electronic music (music prepared not from
the customary written notation but from an admixture of separate tape recordings and tech-
nical effects), the composite of magnetic impulses or photo-chemical impressions recorded in
the "memory" unit of an information retrieval unit, etc.
167 Supra note 151.
168 See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), holding the designs in textile fabrics to be copyrightable; and Boucher v. DuBoyes,
Inc., 253 F.2d 948 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958), holding the design of jewelry
to be copyrightable. But cf. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus
Watch Co., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 260 F.2d 637
(2d Cir. 1958), holding a watch not to be a copyrightable work of art.
169 Report, at 13-15.
170 Id. at 13.
171 A bill providing for a design statute such as that supported by the Report is now
pending in Congress. H.R. 6776 and H.R. 6777, identical bills, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961);
S. 1884, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., identical with H.R. 6776 and H.R. 6777 (1961).
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Although the recommendation is made that copyright protection on a
work of art should be continued when it is utilized as a design on a use-
ful article, the Report states that the registration of the embodiment of
the work of art in the useful article poses substantial administrative
problems for the Copyright Office.172 Providing for the deposit of the
useful article and making the administrative determination as to whether
the useful article does or does not embody the copyrightable work of art
are troublesome. Accordingly, the Report recommends that registration
and deposit under the revised Act be denied to the embodiment of the
work of art in the useful article, and that only the work of art per se
be eligible for registration and deposit.
73
The Report suggests that where a work of art has been copyrighted
but is thereafter registered as a design under the present patent law
174
or under the proposed design law, the protection of the design with
respect to useful articles should thereafter be governed solely under the
patent or design law, although the original copyright protection on the
work would continue with respect to expressions of the work other than
in useful articles. 5
172 Report, at 13.
'73 Id. at 13-15.
'74 35 U.S.C. (1958).
175 (1) The following would be accepted for deposit and registration by the Copyright
Office, since they would not be considered "useful articles":
A painting showing a floral pattern, submitted by a manufacturer of textile fabrics;
a statuette in the form of a human figure, submitted by a lamp manufacturer;
A technical drawing or scale model of an airplane;
A jewelry design embodied in earrings.
(2) The following would not be accepted for deposit and registration by the Copy-
right Office, since they constitute useful articles as such:
A rug; a yard of dress material;
A lamp;
A chair; a dress; a frying pan.
(3) Since the protection available to a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work is not affected by use of the work as a design or decoration of a useful article,
the following works would continue to be accorded full protection under the copyright
statute (unless the owner chooses to secure protection under the patent law or special
design legislation):
A copyrighted painting reproduced on textile fabrics;
A copyrighted cartoon drawing or photograph reproduced on fabrics or in the form of
toys or dolls;
A copyrighted drawing of a chair reproduced on a lampshade;
A copyrighted sculptured figure used as a lamp base.
(4) Under distinctions indicated in existing court decisions, that the copyright in a
work portraying a useful article as such would not protect against manufacture of that
article, copyright protection would not extend to the following cases:
A copyrighted drawing of a chair, used to manufacture chairs of that design;
A copyrighted scale model of an automobile, used to manufacture automobiles of that
design;
A copyrighted technical drawing showing the construction of a machine, used to
manufacture the machine;




2. Architectural drawings and structures.' The Report's recommenda-
tions concerning architectural drawings and structures parallel its recom-
mendations concerning works of applied art generally.177 Guided by the
provision on the subject in the present act,178 it proposes that the new
statute continue to protect architectural drawings against infringement
by the making and distribution of copies of the drawings; but that the
copyright on the drawing should protect against unauthorized "execution"
of the drawing (i.e., by erecting the structure) only where, the structure
is itself a "work of art," i.e., a purely non-functional structure such as
a monument.
With regard to functional structures having non-functional "artistic"
features, the Report makes a recommendation similar to that concerning
the ornamental design of useful articles: these non-functional "artistic"
features should be protected under separate legislation proposed generally
for the protection of ornamental designs of useful articles. Where a work
of art such as a mural or painting, however, is superimposed on an archi-
tectural structure but retains its separate identity, the Report proposes
that the copyright protection on such work of art should continue as
under the present statute.
3. Choreographic works. 9 These works are not mentioned under the
present act, although the Copyright Office permits their registration as
dramatic compositions if the story or theme expressed by music and
action combined or by actions alone is of a dramatic character. 180 The
Report recommends that choreographic works be specifically copyright-
able as such under the new act, regardless of whether they be of dra-
matic or "abstract" character. 181 Inasmuch as the copyright protection
of such works relates primarily to their public performance, it suggests
that ballroom and social dance steps designed merely for the personal
enjoyment of the dancers be excluded from protection under the act. 82
4. Sound recordings.18 8 The questions in this area relate to the protec-
tion of the creative contributions to a recording which derive from
three sources: (1) the author (2) the performer and (3) the record
176 For the general background, see Strauss, "Copyright in Architectural Works," Copy-
right Law Revision Study No. 27, supra note 26, at 63 (1959).
177 Report, at 15-16.
178 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(b), 5(g) (1958).
179 For the general background, see Varmer, "Copyright in Choreographic Works," Copy-
right Law Revision Study No. 28, supra note 26, at 89 (1959).
180 37 C.F.R. § 202.7 (1960).
181 Report, 17.
182 Id., 16-17.
188 For the general background, see Ringer, "The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound
Recordings," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 26, supra note 26, at 1 (1957).'
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producer (e.g., the engineering and directing personnel). The present act
clearly protects the creative contribution of the author.184 The protection
of the act does not extend to the second and third classes of contribu-
tors,188 however, although some protection for these persons has been
obtained under state law.1
8 6
The Report makes no specific proposal with respect to the protection
of sound recordings, but suggests generally that they should be protected
under copyright principles. 7 At the time the Report was submitted, the
joint meeting of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee,
acting under the Universal Copyright Convention, and the Permanent
Committee of the Berne Union had not yet taken place. At that meeting,
however, a "neighboring rights" convention was proposed which has im-
portant ramifications on the protection of sound recordings. 88 The Report
indicates that the Copyright Office is continuing its study of this question
and will shortly submit detailed recommendations.8 9
V.
RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS' 90
A. The General Rights 9.
Under the language of the present act, a copyright owner is granted
essentially the following "exclusive" rights in his work:' 92
1. to make and publish copies of the work;
2. to make new versions of the work if it is literary, dramatic or
musical;
3. to execute a work of art from a model or design thereof;
4. to perform a musical work in public "for profit"'93 (but whether or
not "for profit," if the work is dramatico-musical) ;
5. to perform a literary work in public ("for profit," if the work is
non-dramatic; whether or not "for profit," if the work is dra-
matic); and
184 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(d), 1(e), 101(e) (1958).
185 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
186 See, e.g., Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937);
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101
N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't
1951). But cf. Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 473, 214 N.Y.S.2d
645 (1st Dep't 1961), aff'd, 224 N.Y.S.2d 662, 248 N.E.2d 180 (1961).
187 Report, at 17-18.
188 See note 63 supra.
189 Report, at 18.
190 Report ch. III, at 19-36.
191 Report, at 21-24.
192 See 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
193 This right is subject to the "jukebox exemption," the right to perform music on coin-
operated machines without payment to the copyright owner of the music. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e),
third paragraph (1958). See text at notes 267-72, infra.
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6. to reproduce a literary, dramatic or musical work in a transcription
or recording.1
94
Even in outline form, the specification of the proprietor's rights is far
short of lucid; but the periphrastic draftsmen of the act did not incline
to clarity. The Report wisely counsels a clearer statement of these rights
in the new act.'95
B. Fair Use'96
Notwithstanding the "exclusive" rights granted to the copyright pro-
prietor under the act, the courts have sanctioned the doctrine of "fair
use," which permits another to make use of copyrighted material even
though no express authorization has been granted by the copyright
proprietor. 97
"Fair use" is permitted in order that a proper balance may be struck
between society's interest, in maintaining the pecuniary incentive of a
creator to produce an intellectual property and in facilitating the wide
dissemination of intellectual and cultural contributions. Contrary to a
wide misconception, there is no valid general rule permitting the "fair
use" of a specified number of words or lines of a given work. Generally,
the following criteria constitute a fair use: the use should not impair the
value of the copyright on the copied work; the copier should not have
substituted the intellectual effort of the copyright owner as a substitute
for the copier's own efforts; and the use should be truly "fair," one
which would not appear to a reasonable person to be unjust to the origi-
nal.""8 In weighing these factors, special significance must be accorded
to the purpose of the use: for example, a use made in a scholarly dis-
sertation is more likely to be deemed a "fair use" than one made in a
commercial advertisement.' 99
The Report recognizes the anomaly created by the absence from the
statute of any mention of fair use, and accordingly suggests that a pro-
vision be inserted in the new act to affirm the principle and to indicate
194 Where the recorded work is a musical composition, this right is subject to the com-
pulsory license for the making of sound recordings. See text commencing at note 273, infra.
105 Report, at 24.
198 Report, at 24-25. For the general background, see Latman, "Fair Use of Copyrighted
Works," Copyright Office Study No. 14, supra note 26, at 1 (1958).
197 See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348
(S.D. Cal. 1955); Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publishing Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817
(S.D.N.Y. 1940). But cf. Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp.
165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Henry Holt & Co. Inc. v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
198 See Latman, supra note 5 at 14-18, 29-34; Pilpel & Goldberg, A Copyright Guide
22-25 (1960).
'29 See Henry Holt & Co. Inc. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 197.
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its scope.200 Statutory recognition of the principle is indeed desirable,
but it would probably be wise not to define the scope of the principle
in any but the broadest terms. The United Kingdom Copyright Act of
1956 sets forth in elaborate detail the criteria of "fair dealing" under that
act.201 To insert such precise specification in our act, however, might
well create, with the passage of years and continuing changes in business
practices, difficulty for both copyright owners and users.
20 2
C. Photocopying by libraries20
3
From the days of the medieval monks, scholars have made handwritten
notes and transcriptions of the works of others. The physical limitations
on such laborious copying have acted as a check on its extent. With the
advent, however, of the Xerox, Verifax, Thermofax and other marvels of
modern technology, the use of copying devices presents a problem not
sufficiently covered by a copyright act premised on the copying methods
of the past. Libraries as well as private organizations and governmental
agencies presently make great use of photocopying devices to copy
excerpts, or the entirety of copyrighted works.
Thus, the problem: the researcher demands quick and economical
access to otherwise unavailable works, while the copyright proprietors
of books and periodicals demand revenue from the use of their works.
In the case of technical and scientific periodicals of small circulation,
such revenue may constitute the economic differential between the pub-
lication's survival and demise. With the exception of such minor uses
as may fall within the doctrine of fair use, the present act proscribes any
copying of a copyrighted work without the permission of the copyright
proprietor. 4 Much of the photocopying now performed may, therefore,
constitute copyright infringement which is frequently difficult to dis-
cover and which is almost invariably prohibitively expensive to control.
The new act must therefore provide a system which will not unreasonably
inhibit scholarship and research while providing a feasible means for
protecting the rights of copyright owners.
The Report makes a valid distinction between photocopying per-
formed by public libraries, whose collections are available to the public
200 Report, at 25.
201 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, §§ 6, 9 [1956]. See also id., §§ 7, 41.
202 A statement in the statute of the general principle of fair use, rather than of its
detailed criteria, has an analogue in the present statutory recognition of the general prin-
ciples of equity: "Any court . . . shall have power . . . to grant injunctions according to
the course and principles of courts of equity, on such terms as said court or judge may deem
reasonable." 17 U.S.C. § 112 (1958).
203 Report, at 2 -26. For the general background, see Varmer, "Photoduplication of
Copyrighted Material by Libraries," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 15, supra note 26,
at 45 (1959).
204 See 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1958).
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without charge, and industrial organizations, whose customary concern
in this area is to provide multiple copies of excerpts to their research
workers." 5 For this latter group the Report suggests that an inter-industry
arrangement be established on a private basis, apart from direct regu-
lation under Copyright Act.2"6 Under such an arrangement the industrial
organizations would pay royalties to the publishers in return for the
blanket right to make photocopies for internal use.207
With regard to free public libraries, the Report recommends that
the library should be permitted to supply a single photocopy of an ar-
ticle in a periodical or of a "reasonable part"2 8 of any other publication
to an applicant who states in writing that he requires the material and
will use it solely for his own research. Where, however, the library is re-
quested for a photocopy of an entire publication, the Report favors that
the library be permitted to supply such photocopy only when the ap-
plicant's statement adds that the publication is not available from the
publisher, and the library has no knowledge of such availability incon-
sistent with this statement. As a final safeguard, where the work which
is photocopied bears a copyright notice, the library would be required,
under the Report's recommendation, to affix to the photocopy a warning
that the material appears to be copyrighted.0 9
The Report's recommendations with regard to photocopying are gen-
erally meritorious, but a few modifications to strengthen the protection
of the copyright owner would perhaps be in order. For example, where
a library is requested to photocopy an entire publication, the library
should be required to make at least a minimal effort to determine whether
the publication is in fact available from the publisher.210 Moreover, a
publisher may have granted a license to an agent for the photoduplica-
205 Report, at 26.
206 Ibid. An arrangement somewhat along these lines has been established in Germany.
There, an agreement was signed in 1948 between the German Publishing Ass'n and the
German Industrial Ass'n, setting forth the terms under which members of the Industrial
Ass'n may utilize photocopies of articles appearing in periodicals published by members of
the Publishing Ass'n. See discussion of this agreement in Varmer, supra note 203, at 57-58.
But see also Hein, Gerhard, Vereinbarkeit des "Rahmenabkommens Uiber die Herstellung von
Fotokopien" mit § 1 GWB. (11 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 18-25, no. 1, Jan. 1961.), noted
at 9 Bull. Cr. Soc. 270, Item 182 (1962). The Hein article discusses the application of the
German antitrust law to an agreement along the lines of the one described above.
207 See the discussion of such proposals in First Annual Report By CICP Study Group
(passim), Committee to Investigate Copyright Problems Affecting Communication in Science
and Education (May 10, 1960).
208 The formal recommendation employs the quoted phrase, but it would appear more
appropriate to use the phrase, "relatively small part," which appears in the Report's discus-
sion leading up to this recommendation. Report, 26.
209 Ibid.
210 Such effort could take the form either of an inspection of Books in Print (a standard
annual bibliographic listing) or an insistence by the library that the person requesting the
photocopy present a statement from the publisher that the book is out of print.
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tion of the works on the publisher's list which are out of print,"' in
which case the person seeking a photocopy should be required to obtain
it from the agent, not from the library. It would probably be an oppres-
sive burden neither on the publisher to announce to libraries through
trade media that it has appointed such an agent nor on the library to
ascertain this through the same media. And lastly, a publisher may wish
to put back into print a work which has been out of print but which
has increased in demand over the years; accordingly, where the library
has made available a photocopy of an entire work, the library might be
required to transmit to the publisher or copyright proprietor a simple
notification (such as a postal card) that it has done so.
The new act should in any event make explicit that the photocopying
to be permitted without the proprietor's consent is not to include the
making of such copies for profit. If such photocopies are supplied at a
profit by the copier, there seems little question that the consent of the
copyright proprietor should first be obtained. The supplying of such
photocopies for profit has become a substantial business,"' and the
copyright proprietor should be permitted to receive the share of such
profit to which he is entitled.
D. The "For Profit" Limitation on the Performance Right 1 3
1. The statutory history. Protection of the copyright proprietor's ex-
clusive right to authorize public performance of his work was first rec-
ognized in connection with dramatic works over one hundred years
ago.21 4 But it was not until almost the close of the nineteenth century
that the statute recognized this right in musical compositions. 5 It was
not until 1952, almost twenty years after Jimmy Durante nosed out
211 Quaere, however, whether such a license would be valid where an author has exercised
his right under a publication contract's customary "out-of-print clause" to have all publica-
tion and other rights re-assigned to him by the publisher.
212 In a statement issued recently by Xerox Corporation, a major manufacturer of
photocopying machines, upon its acquisition of University Microfilms, Inc., Xerox stated that
University's sales of document facsimiles to scholars, scientists and libraries were currently
at an annual rate of $2 million. It was indicated by Xerox that University's total net
income for 1961 was more than $180,000. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 21, 1962, p. 9, col. 1.
University Microfilms' catalog indudes books printed in England in the fifteenth century,
early American publications, thousands of out-of-print books of this century, and 1,500
popular magazines and technical journals currently in use ....
University Microfilms estimates it can prepare a full-sized copy of a rare book for
"as little as 3y2 cents a page," or about $7 for a 200-page volume.
Most of these duplications are made one copy at a time and sold to libraries, uni-
versities, researchers, and scholars. The company also records most of the dissertations
submitted to American universities by candidates for doctors' degrees.
Ibid. It is the writer's experience that, prior to photocopying works which are not in the
public domain, University requests permission from the copyright proprietor.
213 Report, at 27-28. For the general background, see Varmer, "Limitations on Perform-
ing Rights," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 16, supra note 26, at 77 (1958).
214 Act of August 18, 1856, ch. 16, 11 Stat. 138 (1859).
215 Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481.
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the plaintiff who had unsuccessfully sued him for his unauthorized broad-
cast of the plaintiff's poems,21 that Congress granted public performance
rights to the proprietors of nondramatic literary works.217 And even today
the statute does not explicitly recognize a public performance right in
a motion picture.18
Through the years, Congress has granted increasing recognition to
the public performance right per se se but it also has developed a dis-
tinction between a work's performance "for profit" and not "for profit."
Since the enactment of the present statute in 1909, the exclusive perform-
ing right granted to copyright proprietors of musical compositions219 and
works prepared for oral delivery (i.e., lectures, sermons, addresses and
similar productions) 229 has been limited to the performance of such
works "for profit"; and the extension in 1952221 of such right to non-
dramatic literary works was also made subject to the limitation of per-
formance "for profit.' 222 There is, however, no "for profit" limitation
on the performance right in dramatic compositions.223
2. The judicial history. It has been held that, to constitute performance
"for profit," it is not necessary that money be taken at the door, where the
performances are not eleemosynary ... [but] are part of a total for which
the public pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is attributed to
a particular item which those present are expected to order is not impor-
tant.... If music did not pay, it would be given up. If it pays, it pays
out of the public's pocket. Whether it pays or not, the purpose of em-
ploying it is profit, and that is enough.224
The quoted principle, enunciated by Mr. Justice Holmes in a case involv-
ing the unauthorized performance in a restaurant of Victor Herbert's
song "Sweethearts," has been followed in a variety of cases including
those holding the public performance of music to be "for profit" where
it is performed as live225 or recorded 26 accompaniment to the exhibition
of silent motion pictures; by the playing of the sound track of a talking
motion picture;27 by a radio broadcast from a station carrying com-
mercial messages228 (even where the broadcasting station is operated by
218 Kreymborg v. Durante, 21 U.S.P.Q. 557, on rehearing, 22 U.S.P.Q. 248 (S.D.N.Y.
1934).
217 Act of July 17, 1952, ch. 923, 66 Stat. 752, amending 17 U.S.C. § 1(c) (1958).
218 See discussion in text at notes 238-55, infra.
219 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1958).
220 Id. § 1(c).
221 See note 217 supra.
222 17 U.S.C. § 1(c) (1958).
223 Id. § 1(d).
224 Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
225 M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E.D.S.C. 1924); Harms
v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922).
226 Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 832 (fth Cir. 1929).
227 Famous Music Corp. v. Melz, 28 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. La. 1939).
228 M. Witmark & Son v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 Fed. 776 (D.NJ. 1923).
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a nonprofit organization only part of whose expenses are met by com-
mercial sponsorship;229) or by a master radio receiving set utilized by a
hotel to provide music to guests through speakers installed in both pub-
lic and private rooms,2 30 or in private rooms alone 31
3. The position of the Report. The Report acknowledges three argu-
ments for the imposition of a "for profit" limitation on the performance
right in nondramatic literary and musical works without a corresponding
limitation for dramatic and dramatico-musical works:2 32 (1) persons
who have attended a nonprofit performance of a work are less inclined
to make payment for a later performance of the same work if the work
is a dramatic work (e.g., a play) than if it is a nondramatic work (e.g.,
a musical composition);233 (2) the primary remuneration to the pro-
prietor of a dramatic work is usually from public performances, although
for the proprietor of a nondramatic work "revenue is also available"
from the sale of copies and phonograph records; and (3) nondramatic
works are much more frequently and easily performed for nonprofit aims
(such as charitable or educational purposes) than are dramatic works.234
For these reasons, the Report favors that under the new act the "for
profit" limitation be continued on the public performance right in non-
dramatic literary and musical works and that the public performance
right in dramatic works continue without this limitation.235
Where the musical compositions to which the Report refers are works
of popular music, the Report's position appears sound. Issue can be taken,
however, with the validity of these three arguments as applied to serious
musical works :236 (1) a person who has attended a nonprofit performance
229 Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 141 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.
1944).
230 Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 51 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.), on remand from Supreme
Court, 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
231 European Stage Authors & Composers Inc. v. Hotel Statler Co., Inc., 19 F. Supp. 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1937).
232 Report, at 28.
233 To which may be added that a restaurant proprietor may still please a patron-in
which case, to use the Holmes phrasing, the music "pays out of the public's pocket"--with
a wired music service performance of a musical composition even if his patron has heard that
composition performed at a free concert the previous evening.
234 This argument points toward permitting wide charitable and educational dissemination
of our intellectual and cultural materials. From the standpoint of minimizing the economic
loss to the creators of musical works, however, this argument, unlike the first two, thrusts in
the opposite direction.
A significant statement in the Report should be noted here: "[A] public performance given
by a charitable, educational, or similar organization, with no motive of private gain, has
been regarded as not 'for profit,' even though the performance was part of a fund-raising
event." Report, at 27. The basis for this statement is not clear. Discussion of this question
is beyond the scope of this article, but the quoted statement in the Report would appear to
be contrary to the implication of the holding in the Debs case, supra note 229. Cf. Varmer,
supra note 213, at 90-91.
235 Report, at 28.
236 See Finkestein, 'Music Rights-Another Vestige of U.S. Cultural Downgrading,"
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of a symphony or concerto is probably no more inclined to pay for a
repeat performance soon afterward than is a person who has attended the
nonprofit performance of a play; (2) the income from public perform-
ances of such serious musical works, although usually small, is greater
than from the sale of copies and recordings; and (3) the seemingly
more widespread performance of serious musical works (than of dra-
matic works) for charitable and educational purposes occurs with a loss
to the music creators of royalties (from both professional and amateur
performances) which, under similar circumstances, are paid to creators of
dramatic works. Thus, some merit appears for granting a public perform-
ance right in serious music without a "for profit" limitation. The drafting
of a workable distinction between serious music and popular music
(based perhaps not only on the character of the work but also on its
length) is not an enviable task, but further consideration should be
given to this question.
Although musical compositions are the nondramatic works most fre-
quently discussed in connection with the "for profit" limitation, there are
of course works other than musical compositions which also fall in the
nondramatic category, and such works should be mentioned here. The
nonprofit public performance of many works such as books, poetry, maps,
art reproductions and photographs is likely to increase sharply within
the near future by their significant use in non-commercial educational
broadcasting. The familiar problem is that of fostering dissemination
of cultural works for worthy purposes while not unreasonably depriving
creators of income.237 Perhaps before a "for profit" limitation is imposed
by the new Act on all public performance rights in the works just men-
tioned, some further consideration should be given to the familiar prob-
lem in this still unfamiliar context.
E. The Extension of the Performance Right to Motion Pictures
238
Motion pictures as such were not expressly recognized as copyright-
able subject matter under the 1909 act; and even though a subsequent
amendment 39 to the act added "motion picture photoplays" (i.e., dra-
matic motion pictures) and "motion pictures other than photoplays" (i.e.,
nondramatic motion pictures) to the classes of copyrightable works
Variety, Jan. 10, 1962, p. 186, col. 1; statement by Herman Finkelstein, counsel for the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Inc. ("ASCAP") at meeting of
Copyright Office Panel of Experts concerning general revision of the U.S. Copyright Law,
held at Library of Congress, September 14, 1961, Transcript,-pp. 54-56.
237 See Varmer, supra note 213, at 114.
238 Report, at 28-30. For the general background, see Varmer, supra note 213, at 104-11,
115-18.
239 Act of August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 488.
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under section 5, the act to this day contains no designation of the rights
of copyright owners in motion pictures per se.
In a series of cases, however, beginning at about the turn of the cen-
tury, the courts undertook to fill in the gap in statutory protection. The
unauthorized copying of a motion picture was held an infringement of
the copyright in a photograph.24 The unauthorized exhibition of a motion
picture photoplay was held an infringement of the right under section
1 (d) of the act to publicly perform a dramatic composition. 4 1 And the
unauthorized exhibition of a documentary film (i.e., a nondramatic
motion picture) was held an infringement of the right to copy under
section 1(a) of the act, in that the images projected upon the screen,
evanescent though they might be, constituted copies of a portion of the
copyright proprietor's work.
2 42
The Report takes the position that the holding of an unauthorized
exhibition to be copying under section 1(a) is an unwise precedent be-
cause it entities the motion picture proprietor to claim that an unauthor-
ized exhibition is an infringement even though it is not a "public" ex-
hibition but takes place, rather, in the private confines of one's living
room.2 43 The motion picture proprietors, however, take the position that
their rights should extend even this far, in large part because of the
expanding business of the sale and license of home movies and the prob-
able future expansion of pay television and devices for the home record-
ing of programs appearing on television screens.
244
If, as the Report proposes,245 a distinction is to be drawn between
"public" exhibition and exhibition in private places, the obvious question
which arises is one of definition. In apparently the only case deciding
the question of when the exhibition of a motion picture constitutes a
"public performance," a federal district court held that exhibition before
240 American Mutoscope & Biograph Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co., 137 Fed. 262 (C.C.N.J.
1905); Edison v. Lubin, 122 Fed. 240 (3d Cir. 1903), appeal dismissed, 195 U.S. 625 (1904).
241 Tiffany Prods., Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 911 (D. Md. 1931); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Distrib. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 3 F. Supp. 66 (D. Mass. 1933). In the latter case, the
court cited as an alternative ground for its decision the theory that if the motion picture were
deemed to be a non-dramatic work, its exhibition on the screen would constitute the
dramatization of a nondramatic work and thus an infringement of the copyright proprietor's
right under § 1(b) of the act. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
242 Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S.
655 (1938).
243 Report, at 28-29.
244 See the commentary on the Report by the Copyright Committee of the Motion Pic-
ture Ass'n of America, Inc. ("MUPAA"). "The Register's Recommendations to Congress for
a New Copyright Statute as They Pertain to Producers and Distributors of Motion Pictures,"
March 2, 1962, pp. 8-12. See also statement of Thomas J. Robinson, Esq., Chairman of the
MPAA Copyright Committee at meeting of Copyright Office Panel of Experts concerning
general revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, held at Library of Congress, September 14, 1961,
Transcript, pp. 61-63.
245 Report, at 29-30.
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members and guests of a social club, was not such a performance. 246 The
Report questions this holding but takes the view, nonetheless, that the
statute should not attempt to define what is a "public" performance of
a motion picture,4 the better course being to leave the definition to be
evolved by the courts in the same manner as the courts have defined what
is a "public" performance of music248 and what constitutes such a per-
formance "for profit. '249 If, however, the only judicial definition to date
is one which the Report itself does not accept, I think it advisable, to
enact a statutory definition. And inasmuch as those performances which
take place at social clubs, camps and schools should be included within
the scope of a proposed statute, the right should be designated as one
of both "public" and "semi-public" performance.
The fundamental concern of the motion picture proprietors, however,
with respect to unauthorized home exhibitions appears not to be the
person who exhibits in the home. The greater culprit seems to be the
person who licenses the bootleg print (i.e., an authorized print which has
been lost or stolen or an illicit "dupe" of an authorized print) of a
motion picture or one who has received a valid license of an authorized
print and then grants unauthorized sublicenses.2 50 A possible solution
here would appear to be that of granting the motion picture proprietor
the exclusive right to make bailments of the work.2 5 1 The grant of such
a right would afford recognition of a unique practice of the motion
picture industry which accounts for the major portion of the dollar
value of motion pictures: customarily, a bailment is made of the physical
property in the print, accompanied by a license to exhibit the copyrighted
work of which the print is a fixation . 52 Granting the exclusive right of
bailment would in general permit the motion picture proprietor under the
act to pursue the possessor of a bootleg print who does not exhibit it but
merely lends or sells the physical property in the print.253 Combining
246 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Wyatt and Maryland Yacht Club, 21 Copy-
right Office Bull. 203 (D. Md. 1932).
247 Report, at 29.
248 See, e.g., Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th
Cir. 1925).
249 See cases cited notes 224-31, supra.
250 See commentary on the Report by the MPAA Copyright Committee, supra note 244,
at 10-12.
251 See id., at 6-8.
252 See letter of Edward A. Sargoy, Esq., December 1, 1958, in Comments and Views
Submitted to the Copyright Office on Limitations on Performing Rights, appendix to Varmer,
supra note 213, at 133.
253 A provision for a right of bailment, however, would constitute a sharp departure from
present theories of protecting copyrighted works. In considering whether the new act should
provide for such a right, therefore, several questions should be studied, including: territorial
divisibility (see Report, 125-26; Kaminstein, "Divisibility of Copyrights," Copyright Law
Revision Study No. 11, supra note 26, at 11-12); and subsequent vending of authorized
copies (see 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1958); Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.
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such a right with a right of public and semi-public performance would
perhaps constitute a proper balance of the interests of motion picture
proprietors and the interests of the public.
Although it would limit the performance right in motion pictures to
public exhibitions, the Report counsels that the performance right should
not be limited to exhibitions "for profit."254 The Report suggests that
the reasons for not imposing the "for profit" limitation on performances
of dramatic works are equally applicable with respect to motion pic-
tures. 5 If in addition the right of semipublic performance is granted
to motion picture proprietors, it would seem proper to grant such a right
also without any "for profit" limitation.
F. Public Reception of Broadcasts256
Broadcasts of copyrighted material are today received not only in
homes but also in hotels, bars, supermarkets and other public places.
Inasmuch as the acts of the proprietors of such hotels, etc., in making the
broadcasts available to their patrons may constitute a "public perform-
ance,Y257 the question arises whether the authorization for such per-
formance should be obtained by the proprietor of the establishment
where the broadcast is received or should be "cleared at the source"
with the broadcaster. In an analogous procedure, ASCAP and Broadcast
Music, Inc. ("BMI"), the primary organizations which license the per-
forming rights in music, grant to networks licenses which do not require
any further license by affiliated stations for their retransmission of net-
work broadcasts. 258 And a similar arrangement is made by these organ-
izations with Muzak and other operators of wired music services25 9 and
with producers of motion pictures.0o In such cases, no further license is
required to perform the wired music where it is received, and no further
license is required to exhibit the motion picture.
1961); United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Tex. 1959)) or unauthorized copies
(see Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. Inc. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 952 (1958); American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 Fed. 829 (2d Cir. 1922). Cf. F. W.
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 229 (1952)).
254 Report, at 29.
255 See text at notes 232-234, supra. The reasons are in fact even more applicable to
motion pictures: while a small town charitable performance of a play would require the
assembling of a cast and scenery at great expense to provide some semblance of the first-run
Broadway performance, the exhibition of a multi-million-dollar blockbuster movie by such a
local organization would require little more than a projector and screen to be substantially
identical to the "hard-ticket" performance for which a world premiere audience pays at least
several dollars. See Varmer, supra, note 213 at 117.
256 Report, at 30-31.
257 As to "performance," see Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931). As
to "public," see the same case on remand from the cited decision, 51 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1931).
258 See Varmer, supra note 213, at 90.
259 See ibid.
260 See id., at 86-87.
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With respect to all works which are to enjoy the public performance
right, the Report recommends that the mere reception of broadcasts
should be exempted from this right, except for those recipients of broad-
casts who make a charge to the public for such reception. 261 As the basis
for its recommendation, the Report states that the enforcement of this
right against the broadcast recipients should not be left to the forbearance
of the copyright proprietors themselves or the performing rights organi-
zations, who, according to the Report, have sometimes sought to require
performing licenses from small establishments for their mere operation of
receiving sets.
2 62
To the extent that demanding licenses from small establishments may
constitute economic duress, however, the solution would appear to lie
not under the Copyright Act but in the regulation of performing rights
organizations 263 But a more basic question with respect to "clearance at
the source" is that of privity. 64 There is privity of contract between
the proprietor of the wired music service and the restaurant which sub-
scribes to the service; between the network and the affiliated station
which retransmits the network programs; and between the motion pic-
ture producer and the exhibitor. But there is customarily no privity be-
tween the broadcaster and the hotel, the bar or the supermarket which
receives the broadcaster's transmissions. Where there is no privity of
contract, it would seem unfair to require the broadcaster to clear the
recipient of any obligation to pay for the exercise of a performing right,
for the broadcaster would not be able to recoup any part of his payment
from the broadcast recipient.266
The proposal for exemption of broadcast reception from the perform-
ance right would appear to be a minor foray into the major question of
regulation of the performing rights organizations.266 The seriousness of
the privity problem suggests, however, that the foray should not be
undertaken without a separate study of the entire question.
261 Report, at 31.
262 Ibid.
263 The question of regulating performing rights organizations is acknowledged by the
Report to be "too large and complex to be dealt with in the present program for copyright
law revision," although it recommends that Congress make a separate comprehensive study
of the question. Report, at 138.
264 See Finkelstein, supra note 236; Varmer, supra note 213, at 90.
See also statements by Herman Finkelstein, counsel for ASCAP and Sidney Kaye, Esq.,
Chairman of the Board, Broadcast Music, Inc., at meeting of Copyright Office Panel of
Experts concerning general revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, held at Library of Congress,
September 14, 1961, Transcript, pp. 56-57 and 59-60, respectively.
265 It would likewise be unfair to expect the broadcaster to recoup from its advertisers the
payments made by the broadcaster to clear for broadcast recipients who may block out the
broadcast commercials to insert their own, e.g., in store-wide broadcasts.
266 See note 263, supra.
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G. The Jukebox Exemption267
Under the present act266 the performance of a musical composition on
a "coin-operated machine" (i.e., a jukebox) is expressly designated as not
a public performance for profit unless a fee is charged for admission to
the place where the performance occurs. The "jukebox exemption," as
this provision has come to be known, is unique in the act. No other com-
mercial users of copyrighted material enjoy an explicit exemption from
remunerating the copyright owner for the performance of his work for
profit. As the Report points out, the jukeboxes of 1909 were a compara-
tively insignificant novelty of the day, as contrasted with the jukebox
industry of today which is one of the largest commercial users of music,
grossing an estimated annual revenue of over $500,000,00069 Many
attempts at Congressional repeal or modification of this exemption have
been made since 1909, but without avail. The Report advocates repeal
of the jukebox exemption without awaiting general revision of the Act,
or at least replacement by a requirement that the copyright owners of
music be paid reasonable license fees by jukebox operators.270
The Music Operators of America, Inc., the industry organization of
jukebox operators, takes the position that the performance of music on
coin-operated machines ordinarily is not a public performance, in that
the individual invariably selects his record, it is his choice, he pays for
it, no other person has any choice in that selection, he has to listen to
it or close his ears, it is a private performance--ordinarily this is the way
the jukebox is played.
2 71
No comment need be made on the characterization of the playing of a
jukebox as a "private performance." It speaks, quite audibly, for itself.
267 Report, at 31-32.
268 17 U.S.C. i 1 (e), third paragraph (1958).
269 Report, at 32.
270 Ibid.
271 Statement by Mr. Nicholas E. Allen on behalf of Music Operators of America, Inc. at
meeting of Copyright Office Panel of Experts concerning general revision of the U.S. Copy-
right Law, held at Library of Congress, September 14, 1961, Transcript, p. 58.
In a general release appearing in one of the music industry's trade papers, the MOA has
also stated, somewhat more eloquently, in referring to the jukebox exemption:
With the advent of copyright fee collection. societies in the early '30's, there have
been almost annual attempts to amend this section of the Copyright Act. These attempts
are through bills introduced in Congress which would force the music operator to pay.
In the past, these bills have recommended that the fee be SO MUCH per side-SO
MUCH per machine-SO MUCH per week-SO MUCH per month-SO MUCH
per year.
SO MUCH, SO MUCH, EVER AND EVER SO MUCH! ....
AND, by payment of a mechanical royalty fee on records, the juke box operators
are very close to being the largest single industry financial contributors in the field
of music!
Why ... is our industry asked to support a small rich minority of songwriters? Why
must we rattle the tin cup for musicians? . . .
Billboard Music Week, March 3, 1962, p. 46.
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But if the crux of the jukebox operators' position is indeed that a juke-
box performance is not a public performance, the act should perhaps be
revised to state that the exclusive rights granted to the copyright pro-
prietor shall include the right to authorize jukebox performances in
any public place, irrespective of whether the performances are "public"
or "private."
Moreover, it does not follow from the fact that the major performing
rights organizations have been defendants in government antitrust ac-
tions272 that the members of such organizations should be deprived of
royalties for jukebox performances. If, in their negotiation of licenses
with jukebox operators, the performing rights organizations run afoul of
our country's antitrust policy, the solution is not to insert in the Copy-
right Act a bar to the collection of royalties from specified users but,
rather, to enact statutory regulation of these organizations or utilize the
existing or future antitrust laws.
H. The compulsory license for the recording of music.
2 73
In the leading case of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co., 74 the United States Supreme Court held that under the Copyright
Act then in force2 75 a pianola roll was not a "copy" of a copyrighted
musical composition and that the manufacture and sale thereof therefore
did not constitute an infringement of the copyrighted work. Thereafter,
to insure to copyright proprietors of music their rightful revenue from
"parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical
work," Congress, under the 1909 act, granted to such proprietors the
exclusive right to control mechanical reproductionY.7  At the hearings
prior to the passage of the act, however, Congress was informed that,
in anticipation of a possible decision by the Supreme Court in the White-
Smith case recognizing mechanical reproduction rights, the Aeolian Co.
had obtained exclusive contracts for such rights from more than eighty
leading music publishers, and that it was in partial consideration for
these agreements that the Aeolian Co. was carrying the White-Smith case
to the Supreme Court. It was also alleged that after the decision in the
White-Smith case adverse to the interests of the Aeolian Co., modifica-
272 See United States v. ASCAP, Civil Action No. 13-95, Domestic Consent Decree,
entered March 4, 1941, amended March 14, 1950 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. BMI Civil
Action No. 459, Consent Decree, entered February 3, 1941, modified May 14, 1941
(E.D. Wis.).
273 Report, at 32-36. For the general background, see Henn, "The Compulsory License
Provisions of the U.S. Copyright Law," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 5, supra note
26, at 1 (1956); Blaisdell, "The Economic Aspects of the Compulsory License," Copyright
Law Revision Study No. 6, supra note 26, at 87 (1958).
274 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
275 Act of March 3, 1891, Rev. Stat. § 4952 (1891).
276 17 U.S.C. § I(e) (1958).
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tions of such contracts were prepared in anticipation of the grant of
mechanical reproduction rights by Congress.2 77 To avoid the danger
of monopolization of the manufacture and sale of mechanical reproduc-
tions, Congress therefore inserted the "compulsory licensing" provi-
sion2'" into the present act.
The essence of the compulsory license provision is that a copyright
proprietor's exclusive right to license the recording of his music expires
with the first recording he makes or authorizes, after which any other
person may record the work upon payment to the copyright proprietor
of two cents per recording of the work. The customary practice of
record companies is to secure licenses from copyright proprietors rather
than rely on the compulsory license, but the two cent ceiling imposed
by the statute acts as an artificial limitation on the royalty which the
copyright proprietor may demand. And the copyright proprietor may
not prevent a third party from recording the work, regardless of the
possibly inferior technical or artistic quality of the third party's record-
ing or his financial instability." 9 The Report approaches the question
of the compulsory license from the valid premise that unless there is
a conflict with the public interest the author of a work should have the
exclusive right to its exploitation. 280 Accordingly, it recommends that
the compulsory licensing provision be eliminated as unnecessary-if
indeed it ever was necessary-to meet the anti-monopoly purpose for
which it was originally enacted by Congress.2 '
In reaching its conclusion on this question the Report answers three
arguments favoring the provision which it states are made by the record
manufacturers (who would be required to negotiate for recording rights
without any fixed ceiling on the recording fees if the provision were
eliminated). s2 One of the contentions is that the provision makes
available to the record purchaser a greater variety of recordings of a
given work than would be available if the copyright proprietor granted
an exclusive license to a single record company. The Report takes the
position, however, that if recording rights were licensed on an exclusive
basis each record company would record different works, and the re-
sulting increase in the variety of works recorded would more than
offset any decline in the variety of recordings of a more limited number
of works. To the contention that the provision permits smaller record
217 H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1909). For a detailed study of the
legislative history of the compulsory licensing provision, see Henn, supra note 273, at 2-12.
278 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1958).
279 Report, at 33.
280 Id. at 35.
281 Id. at 35-36.
282 Id. at 33-35.
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companies to compete more effectively with larger companies (by offering
other recordings of the same works), the Report replies that this is a
street which can be travelled both ways: the unique hit of the smaller
record company frequently loses out in the competition with the larger
companies (with well-known recording artists), which quickly bring out
their own recordings of the smaller company's hit.
The third contention which is discussed by the Report is that, be-
cause of the variety of recordings made, copyright proprietors receive
greater revenues under the present system than they would receive if the
compulsory license were abolished. The Report, however, points out
that most author and publisher groups favor the abolition of the com-
pulsory license, and that if non-exclusive licenses are truly in the best
interests of copyright proprietors it can be assumed that, left to their
own devices-mechanical and other-the copyright proprietors will
grant such licenses. But in any event the copyright proprietor, with
the abolition of the compulsory license, would be able to make his own
decision to deal with a record company, or to decline to do so because
that company cannot offer the copyright proprietor sufficiently favorable




A. The Present Notice Requirement
The United States is the only major producer of copyrightable works
which imposes on all published works the use of a copyright notice as
a condition for securing copyright. 8 4 With the recent advent of the
Universal Copyright Convention, the member countries have acknowl-
edged the concept of copyright notice, 8 5 but the United States remains
the prime country in which the notice is generally used.
Notice has been a requirement in our federal law since 1790,286 and
283 Report ch. VI, at 61-67. For the general background, see Doyle, Cary, McCannon
& Ringer, "Notice of Copyright," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 7, supra note 26, at
1 (1957); Blaisdell, "Commercial Use of the Copyright Notice," Copyright Law Revision
Study No. 8, supra note 26, at 65 (1959); Rogers, "Use of the Copyright Notice by
Libraries," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 9, supra note 26, at 91 (1959); Berger,
"False Use of Copyright Notice," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 10, supra note 26,
at 109.
284 See Doyle, Cary, McCannon & Ringer, supra note 283, at 26-28. Many countries,
however, require the use of a notice with respect to specific categories of works. See id.,
at 29-36.
285 The UCC does not mandate the use of a copyright notice but states, rather, that the
proper use of the UCC form of notice will satisfy the "formalities" required by a member
country as a condition of copyright, such as deposit, registration, notice, notarial certificates,
payment of fees or manufacture or publication in that country. UCC art. III, fI 1.
286 The Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 required that notice of registration be published
in newspapers. Id. § 3.
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the requirement that such notice be placed in published copies of copy-
righted works has been with us since 1802.287 With the exception of
those classes of works which may be copyrighted by registration in
unpublished form,2 8 a work generally obtains protection under the
present statute by means of publication with a copyright notice on all
copies, 8 9 such notice to be in a specified form290 and position.291 Where
the copyright proprietor has attempted to comply with the notice re-
quirements of the act, however, the accidental or mistaken omission
of the prescribed notice from a particular copy or copies does not neces-
sarily invalidate the copyright.292
The requirement of copyright notice has served a valuable function.
The notice in a published copy of a book, for example, customarily dis-
closes the name of the original copyright proprietor or that of a suc-
cessor record owner of the copyright and the date of the first publication
of the work. Thus, the copyright notice can be utilized in determining
whether the work is still in copyright and from whom permission may
be sought for use of the work.293 The present rigidity of our notice
requirements, however, is an onerous counterweight to these advantages.
For example, a failure to record an assignment of copyright before
substituting the assignee's name for that of the assignor in the notice
will void the copyright. 294 The insertion of the notice on an incorrect
page of a book may achieve the same unfortunate result. 95 A similar
result is obtained by the placement of a single notice, rather than repe-
titions of the notice, on a sheet containing several reproductions of a
painting;296 or by the placement of the notice on a tag affixed to a piece
287 Act of April 29, 1802, 2 Stat. 171 at §§ 1-2.
288 See note 35, supra.
289 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1958).
290 Id. § 19.
291 Id. § 20.
292 See id. § 21. But see cases cited note 299, infra.
293 If the name in the notice is not that of the present copyright proprietor, it can none-
theless be used as a starting point in searching the recorded chain of title in the Copyright
Office. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 30-32 (1958); 37 C.F.R. §§ 201.2.
The Report (at 62) points out that the notice requirement is valuable in placing most of the
great mass of published material (which includes miscellaneous pamphlets, circulars, manuals,
corporation reports, etc.) in the public domain for free use by all. Quaere, however, whether
this is truly an advantage of the notice requirement, or whether the doctrine of fair use
would not afford sufficient access to such materials if they were protected by copyright from
the time of their creation, as under the system advocated by the writer and others. (Under a
system of copyright from creation, works would automatically be subject to protection.) See
the discussion of fair use in text at notes 196-202 supra. See also text at notes 309-11 and
312-315 infra.
294 Group Publishers, Inc. v. Winchell, 86 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
295 United Thrift Plan, Inc. v. National Thrift Plan, Inc., 34 F.2d 300 (ED.N.Y. 1929);
J. A. Richards, Inc. v. N.Y. Post, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
206 Louis Dejonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 235 U.S. 33 (1914). But cf. Boucher
v. DuBoyes, Inc., 253 F.2d 948 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958); Scarves By
Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants and Mfrs., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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of jewelry from which it may become detached.2 97 Moreover, an omis-
sion of the notice from the work deprives the work of its statutory
protection,298 and may do so even where the omission is an oversight.299
B. The Report's Recommendations Concerning Notice
In recognition of the value of the copyright notice, the Report suggests
that it continue as a requirement for published copies of copyrighted
works,"° but that the requirement be made less stringent. The Report
proposes that the provision in section 21 of the present act for avoiding
forfeiture where the notice has been omitted from "a particular copy or
copies"' 0 ' should be broadened in the new act. Under its proposal, if
the notice is omitted inadvertently from as much as an entire edition
or printing of a work, the copyright claimant would be able to avoid
forfeiture by filing with the Copyright Office, within one year after
the publication of the defective copies, a statement of the circumstances
causing the omission of the notice.302 The Report also recommends that
an innocent infringer who has been misled by the omission of notice
should not be liable for an infringement commenced prior to learning
of the registered copyright claim and should not be enjoined from
completing such an infringement unless he is fully reimbursed for his
outlay. And recommendations are made for the filing of an explanatory
statement and the exculpation of an innocent infringer with respect to
a work carrying an erroneous name or date in the copyright notice. 303
297 See Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. B. Steinberg-Kaslo Co., 144 F. Supp. 577,
582 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). But see Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487
(2d Cir. 1960).
298 Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
299 See Sieff v. Continental Auto Supply, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1941). But see
Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1927); Strauss v. Penn
Printing & Publishing Co., 220 Fed. 977 (EJ). Pa. 1915).
300 "A notice of copyright, consisting of either the word 'copyright' or the symbol ©,
accompanied by the name of the copyright owner and the year date of first publication,
should be required in all published copies of copyrighted works." Report, at 66.
301 See text accompanying note 292 supra.
302 With respect to inadvertent omission of the notice:
(a) If the notice is omitted inadvertently from a few copies only, and other copies
bear the notice, the copyright should not be invalidated.
(b) If the notice is omitted inadvertently from more than a few copies or from an
entire edition or printing, the copyright should not be invalidated if-
(1) A copyright claim is registered before, or within 1 year after, publication of the
copies without notice; and
(2) A statement of the circumstances of the omission is filed within that 1-year
period.
(c) In any case, an innocent infringer who is misled by the omission should not be
liable for an infringement begun before he is actually informed that a copyright claim
has been registered, and should not be enjoined from completing the infringement
innocently begun unless he is fully reimbursed for his outlay.
Report, at 66.
303 An erroneous name or date in the notice should not invalidate the copyright.
However:
(a) Any person not actually informed otherwise should be entitled to act on the
assumption that the name and date given in the notice are correct.
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The Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) does not require the
insertion of the UCC notice in any specified location in the work, but
requires only that the notice be "placed in such manner and location
as to give reasonable notice of claim of copyright.1304 The Report wisely
favors adopting the more lenient requirement as to location,30 5 rather
than continuing the present detailed specifications of required position
for various classes of works.
30 6
Where the elements of the notice are dispersed so that it is not clear
which name or which date is to accompany the symbol "©" or the word
"Copyright," the Report proposes that the notice not be invalidated.
The new act, under this proposal, would instead adopt the presumption
that if no name is clearly a part of the notice, the author, or if no author
is named then the publisher, is the copyright owner. And likewise, if no
date is clearly a part of the notice, the date should be presumed as that
of the imprint or issue date in the copy.30 7 Where a collective work
contains a single notice, the Report recommends that it be deemed
sufficient under the new act for not only the work as a whole but also
each of the individual component works, including those previously
copyrighted. 08
The notice proposals of the Report are a small step in the direction
of the notice provisions of the patent0 9 and trademark310 laws. Under
these laws the omission of notice does not necessitate forfeiture of the
owner's rights in his patent or in his trademark registration but may
merely deprive the owner of certain of his remedies. Even though the
(b) Where the year date in the notice is more than 1 year later than the date of
first publication, the claimant should be required to record in the Copyright Office,
within 1 year after the publication of copies bearing the later date, a statement showing
the correct year date and the circumstances in which the later date was given.
Ibid.
304 UCC art. IH, f1 1.
305 Report, at 66.
306 See 17 U.S.C. § 20 (1958). But cf. id. § 9(c), first paragraph.
307 Report, at 67.
308 Ibid.
309 Patentees, and persons making or selling any patented article for or under them,
may give notice to the public that the same is patented, either by fixing thereon the
word "patent" or the abbreviation "pat.", together with the number of the patent ....
In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in
any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the
infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be
recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice ...
35 U.S.C. § 287 (1958).
310 Notwithstanding the . . [constructive notice afforded the registrant's claim of
ownership], a registrant of a mark ...shall give notice that his mark is registered
by displaying with the mark as used the words "Registered in U.S. Patent Office" or
"Reg. U.S. Pat. Off." or the letter R enclosed within a circle, thus (D; and in any suit
for infringement under this chapter by such a registrant failing so to mark goods
bearing the registered mark ...no profits and no damages shall be recovered under
the provisions of this chapter unless the defendant had actual notice of the registration..
15 U.S.C. 1111 (1958).
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copyright notice requirements proposed by the Report are less stringent
than those of the present act, it would remain essentially true under
the proposed requirements that the omission of a copyright notice on
published copies of a work would deprive the copyright claimant of
not merely his remedies but also his rights under the act. Further con-
sideration should be given to the question of a permissive rather than
mandatory, theory of copyright notice, more similar to the theory under-
lying the notice provisions in the patent and trademark laws.31
C. The Copyright Notice Under a System of Copyright From Creation
of the Work
A proposal made by the writer and others is that the new act reject
a theory of separate common law protection for unpublished (or un-
disseminated) works and adopt instead a single system of federal
copyright under which the period of protection would not run from
the date of first publication (or dissemination) but from the creation
of the work.3" The year date in any copyright notice to be prescribed
under such a system should provide information to assist persons in
determining whether the work is still in copyright. For works authored
by natural persons, the date of the author's death would be the point
from which the term would be measured; but the uncertainty of this
date would obviously present a practical obstacle while the author is still
alive. A legend or symbol could however accompany the date of first
publication in the notice, to indicate that the author is alive at the time
of such publication.8 13 After the author's death, the year of his death
could be inserted in any republication of the work.
The Universal Copyright Convention requires that the United States
grant protection to certain foreign works which bear a notice contain-
ing only the symbol © accompanied by the name of the copyright pro-
prietor and the year of the work's first publication.314 The new act
therefore cannot require of such foreign works a notice containing the
further information as to whether or not the author is alive. The new
act could of course impose the requirement on domestic works only.
It might be preferable, however, to maintain a uniform requirement
for both foreign and domestic works; and the additional information
311 Detailed consideration of this question is not within the scope of this article, but
it should be noted that there are of course significant differences among these laws which
have ramifications for the question of notice: patent protection is founded upon novelty,
trademark protection on user and copyright protection on originality; etc.
312 See discussion in pts. II and III hereof, supra.
313 This would permit one to determine that the term of copyright on a given work
is to last at least fifty years (i.e., if a "life-plus-fifty" system is adopted) from the date
contained in the copyright notice. See note 104, supra.
314 UCC art. III, ff 1.
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suggested for the notice might be obtained instead by offering an in-
ducement to its inclusion. For example, extraordinary remedies such
as statutory damages could be made available to foreign and domestic
works only where the notice contains the additional information.
A requirement, or an inducement, for the inclusion of information
in the copyright notice in addition to that already required by the act
would of course make the notice provisions more complicated, and
hence make more difficult the task of the claimant who seeks to obtain
maximum protection for his work. This difficulty therefore poses a
practical consideration against which any proposal for the inclusion of
further information must be weighed. It may be that, after the matter
has been considered further, the inclusion of such additional informa-
tion would not appear to justify the additional complexity. If such is
the case, the date of an author's death would appear nonetheless to be
sufficiently ascertainable in our contemporary society to permit the
use of that date as the base point for measuring the term of protection
for a natural author." 5
VII.
REGISTRATION AND DEPOSIT OF CopMs 31
6
A. The Present Registration System
Unlike many other countries,317 the United States maintains an of-
ficial system for registration of claims to protection of literary and
artistic property: for published works, mandatory registration "prompt-
ly" after publication; 318 and for certain unpublished works, registration
at the option of the owner. 19 From the time of our original copyright
statute in 1790,326 the registration system has been an integral feature
of the United States copyright law. 21 Although the governmental sys-
tem of registration is not commonly found in the major foreign coun-
tries, the need for some sort of registration system is evidenced by the
fact that in those foreign countries which lack a governmental system
315 See notes 100, 101, supra and accompanying text, and text at note 102, supra.
316 Report ch. VII, at 69-82. For the general background, see Kaplan, "The Registration
of Copyright," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 17, supra note 26, at 1 (1958); Berger,
"Authority of the Register of Copyrights to Reject Applications for Registration," Copy-
right Law Revision Study No. 18, supra note 26, at 81 (1959); Dunne, "Deposit of
Copyrighted Works," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 20, supra note 26, at 1 (1960).
317 See Kaplan, supra note 316, at 60-63.
318 17 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14 (1958). But cf. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306
U.S. 30 (1939); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 161 F.2d
406 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947).
319 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1958). See note 35, supra.
320 Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124, at §§ 1, 3.
321 See Kaplan, supra note 316, at 9-20.
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of registration it has been necessary for private organizations to main-
tain a registry for their own use. 22
The registration system under the present act performs several valua-
ble functions. 23 It provides proof of the existence of the copyrighted
work as of a given time and evidence (including the prima facie evi-
dentiary value of the registration certificate3 24 ) of the facts supporting
the copyright claim. The registration of the original copyright claim,
together with the recordation of subsequent assignments of copyright,
provides a recorded chain of title which can be traced by any person
interested in acquiring rights under the copyright. The Examining
Division of the Copyright Office reviews the copyright claims which are
submitted for registration and is in a position to sift out claims which
are obviously invalid (e.g., claims for registration of a trademark or
for patent protection on an invention) and to inform misguided claimants
of the basic provisions of the act. Also, as discussed below, the present
registration system enables the Library of Congress to obtain automatic
deposits of works for its collections. 825
B. The Report's Proposals Concerning Registration
The premise of the Report concerning registration provisions under
the new act appears to be sound: it favors a public registration system
affording the most complete and dependable record possible without
imposing forfeiture of copyright as a penalty for failure to register. 26
In other words, the carrot rather than the stick is to be relied upon,
and strong inducements are recommended to encourage registration
within a reasonable time.
The present remedies under the act include the traditional tort
remedies of injunction against infringement2 7 and recovery of actual
damages.328 But also included are more extraordinary remedies such as:
an award of costs and attorney's fees;3 29 the impounding and destruction
of the infringing copies; 330 and an award of the defendant's profits or
statutory damages in lieu of actual damages and profits.3 31 The Report
recommends that where registration has not been effected within a
322 See id. at 60-61; Report, at 73.
323 See Report, at 72-73.
324 17 U.S.C. § 209 (1958). See id. § 210, with respect to the prima facie evidentiary
value of the catalog of copyright entries.
325 See text at notes 345-53, infra.
326 Report, at 73.
327 17 U.S.C. §§ 101(a), 101(e), 112 (1958).
328 Id. § 101(b).
329 Id. §§ 1(e), 116.
330 Id. § 101(c), (d).
331 Id. §§ 1(e), 101(b), (e).
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specified short period of time,332 or prior to the commencement of an
infringement, the copyright owner's civil remedies with respect to an
infringement begun prior to registration should be limited. The remedies
in such a case would be confined to an award of the proprietor's actual
damages and, in the discretion of the court: (1) an injunction against
future infringement and, on condition that the infringer be reimbursed
for his outlay, against completion of the infringement already com-
menced; and (2) an order for the impounding and destruction of the
infringing articles.133  The Report suggests that in all cases the court
should be left with discretion concerning the award of costs and at-
torney's fees to the prevailing party.
3 34
Under the present act, registration is a prerequisite to the institution
of suit.335 It has been held that where the Register of Copyrights has
refused registration of a work, the claimant may not sue for infringe-
ment until registration has been secured by means of a mandamus pro-
ceeding against the Register. 33 The Report recognizes the needless ex-
pense of such an additional proceeding. It therefore recommends that
where the claimant has complied with the procedural requirements for
registering but registration has been refused by the Register, the claimant
may nonetheless sue for infringement. The Register, however, must be
notified of such suit and be given the right to appear in the action. In
this manner, the single action would adjudicate the validity of the
copyright claim.337
Under present law, there is no explicit statement of the Register's
authority to refuse registration because of the claimant's failure to com-
ply with the requirements of the act. The Report points out that it
would be most inadvisable for the Copyright Office to register claims
without regard to their validity, for to do so would materially lessen
the probative value of registration and of the registration certificate.338
Accordingly, the Report suggests that, although the revised act should
explicitly require the Register to make registration of any claim which
has complied with the procedural requirements and appears valid under
332 The period would be thiee months after first public dissemination of the work in the
United States, or six months after the work's first public dissemination abroad. Under the
recommendation, foreign works entitled to protection under the Universal Copyright Con-
vention would be entitled to all remedies regardless of the time of registration. Report, at
76-77.
33 Ibid.
334 Report, at 77.
335 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
336 Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., Inc., 260
F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958).
337 Report, at 75-76.
338 Id. at 76.
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the statute he should be expressly authorized to refuse registration, sub-
ject to judicial review, for any claim which he finds to be invalid.339
It is sound to make explicit the Register's authority to refuse registra-
tion. But it would also be sound to restrict the exercise of this authority
to copyright claims which have not fulfilled the procedural require-
ments or do not appear to be valid under the express terms of the statute.
To grant the Register broader authority than this would be granting
him what in some instances would constitute a power of censorship.
The statute does not explicitly deny copyright to seditious, libelous or
obscene works or other works containing matter which is illegal or
contrary to public policy. There is judicial authority, however, that
such works may be denied copyright protection. 340 Under the present
act, the Register is apparently empowered, but not required, to refuse
registration on such grounds.341 I submit that to authorize the Register
to examine the copyrightability of works from any standpoint other
than that of the prerequisites specified in the act would be administra-
tively unfeasible and unwise policy.342
The Report recommends that the certificate of registration continue
to be prima facie evidence of the facts set forth therein, but with an
important qualification.343 It acknowledges that where the registration
is made after a considerable period of time following the inception of
the copyright the reliability of the facts set forth in the registration
application has been impaired. Thus, it recommends that the prima facie
evidentiary feature of such information should be available only where
the registration has been made not more than one year following the
date of the work's first public dissemination. In instances where the
registration has been made after the one-year period has expired, the
Report recommends that the evidentiary value of the facts set forth
in the certificate should be left to the discretion of the court. 44 Such
339 Ibid.
340 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 Fed. 375 (N.D.N.Y. 1913) (dictum); Broder
v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 Fed. 74 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898); Richardson v. Miler, 20
Fed. Cas. 722 (No. 11791) (C.C.D. Mass. 1877).
341 This may be inferred from the somewhat pleonastic prose of the Attorney General
in a recent opinion:
I am of the opinion that the discretion conferred upon the Register by the Copyright
Law leaves him free to decide not to attempt to refuse or deny registration of claims
to copyright in works of the nature [discussed in the text] ....
41 Ops. A.G. [No. 73], p. 8 (1958) [121 U.S.P.Q. at 333].
342 Cf. the Opinion of the Attorney General, supra note 341:
. . . [Ebxaminations [by the Register] of any more than the question whether the
works involved meet the specific statutory requirements of the Act may be regarded as
not feasible administratively. In addition, for policy reasons it may not be thought
appropriate for the Register to undertake to be a conservator of public morals.
Ibid. at p. 7.
343 Report, at 75.
344 Ibid.
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a provision would be of further value, in that it would encourage prompt
registration and thus enhance the accuracy of the Copyright Office rec-
ords for prospective searchers.
C. The Deposit System
Most of the major countries of the world require deposits of do-
mestically published works with a public archive, in order to enrich
the national cultural collection.f45 The United States has such a re-
quirement,346 for the purpose of enriching the collections of the Library
of Congress and identifying the works for which a claim to copyright
is registered.
The Report recognizes the general soundness of the present deposit
system, under which two copies of the best edition of a published
work are generally required to be deposited in the Copyright Office.
47
With regard to certain classes of works, however, the deposit is either
not wanted by the Library of Congress or may present difficulties by
reason of certain characteristics of the work, such as its size, fragility
or weight. For such works, the deposit of photographs of the work
is permitted in lieu of actual copies of the work; 348 or, in the case of
a motion picture, the depositor is permitted to retrieve the copies of
the work after deposit, upon agreement with the Library of Congress
to supply a copy if later requested.349 The Report recommends, how-
ever, that the Register be given statutory authority to require compli-
ance with such alternative deposit procedures as the Register may deem
fit.350 The flexibility inherent in such a system would permit the accom-
modation of the deposit system to such changes as experience and tech-
nological development may from time to time require.
Under the present act,351 where the required deposit has not been
made the Register may make written demand on the copyright pro-
prietor for such deposit. If the deposit is not then forthcoming, the
copyright proprietor is liable to certain penalties, including a fine of
one hundred dollars and forfeiture of the copyright. Such forfeiture,
however, occurs in only four or five cases a year.3 52 The Report recom-
mends that the fine be increased to two hundred dollars but takes no
345 See Report, at 77; Dunne, supra note 316, at 1-11.
346 17 U.S.C. §§ 13-14, 213-14 (1958).
347 Id. § 13.
348 Ibid.; 37 C.F.R. § 202.16.
349 See Report, at 78.
350 Id. at 79.
351 17 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
352 Report, at 80.
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position as to whether the present provision for forfeiture of copyright




A. Works Made for Hire, and Composite Works 55
The present act permits statutory copyright to be secured by either
the author or proprietor (or his personal representatives or assigns) , .
or, in the case of a work made for hire, by the employer (who is deemed
to be the "author") .35 Under present law, a work is "made for hire" if
it is created by one who is a salaried employee in the regular scope
of his employment.358
The Report recommends that the revised act continue recognition of
the employer as the one entitled to the copyright under such circum-
stances. 5 It rejects as unworkable any plan under which the rights
in a work would be divided between the employer and the employee by
means of a statutory formula. For example, in the case of a motion
picture, where the work is the composite product of many employees,
it would be impractical or impossible to separate the various contribu-
tions of the creative employees involved; and consequently any pro-
spective user of a portion of the composite work would find it difficult
to ascertain the correct person to whom the rights in a specific creative
contribution belonged.
3 60
In the case of certain printed copyrighted works, however, such as
periodicals and encyclopedias, that contain the contributions of a num-
ber of authors, the Report recommends that the publisher should have
the right to secure copyright but that such copyright should cover only
the contributions not separately copyrighted; and in the absence of an
express agreement, the only right assigned to the publisher would be
the right to publish the contribution in a similar composite work, the
353 Id. at 81.
354 Report ch. VIII, at 83-98.
555 For the general background, see Varmer, 'Works Made for Hire and on Commission,"
Copyright Law Revision Study No. 13, supra note 26, at 123 (1958).
356 17 U.S.C. J 9 (1958).
357 Id. § 26.
358 See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1941); Tobani
v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 98 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 650 (1938); Varmer,
supra note 355, at 128-30; Report at 85-87. Cf. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Jerry Vogel
Music Co., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 221 F.2d 569
(2d Cir. 1955).
859 Report, at 88.
360 Id. at 86.
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balance of rights in the author's contribution to be held by the pub-
lisher in trust for the author. 6'
B. Co-ownership of Copyright
62
The present act does not deal explicitly with the rights of co-owners
among themselves and with respect to third parties. The courts have
generally established, however, that where a copyright is owned by
more than one person, any co-owner may transfer to a third party non-
exclusive rights under the copyright, although the transferor in such a
case must account to his co-owners for any proceeds received by him. 63
The result is that one seeking to acquire exclusive rights under a copy-
right owned by more than one person must obtain his grant from all
of the co-owners.
As the Report points out, the law is otherwise in the United Kingdom
and certain other countries, where no valid grant of rights, exclusive
or non-exclusive, may be made without the consent of all co-owners of
the copyright. 364 This rule, however, while protecting the control of
every co-owner over the copyright, may inhibit the widespread dissem-
ination of jointly owned works. Of course, the inducement to dissemina-
tion of a work through a nonexclusive grant from a single co-owner,
under the American rule, is frequently nullified by the fact that each
of the remaining co-owners can likewise make grants to third parties:
a motion picture producer would understandably be reluctant to under-
take a multimillion-dollar production based on a literary work the
rights in which might also be acquired by a competitor for the pro-
duction of another motion picture. But on balance, the American rule
would appear to facilitate, rather than hinder, dissemination of jointly
owned works. The Report therefore properly recommends that the
new act leave unimpaired the American rule established by court de-
cisions. 3 5
Where the contributions of two or more authors are merged into a
single work the present act does not provide criteria for determining
whether the work is one of "joint authorship." The Report favors a
retreat under the revised act from the holding in the Twelfth Street Rag
361 Id. at 87-88.
362 For the general background, see Cary, "Joint Ownership of Copyrights," Copyright
Law Revision Study No. 12, supra note 26, at 83 (1958).
-363 E.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 221 F.2d 569, modified
on rehearing 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955); Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc. v. Miller Music,
Inc., 272 App. Div. 571, 74 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 782, (1949). See
Cary, supra note 362, at 92-96; Report, at 88-89.
364 Report, at 89. See Cary, supra note 362, at 102-09.
305 Report, at 90. See note 363 and accompanying text.
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case 66 that where the assignee of the copyright in a musical composi-
tion had later commissioned a lyricist to write words for the music, the
resulting work was one of "joint authorship." There was in fact no
collaboration by the "joint authors" nor any intention on the part of
the original author that the musical composition be combined with the
lyric contribution of the later author. The Report recommends that
the new act define a work of joint authorship as one in which the authors
have joined their contributions with the intention of integrating them
into a single work.367
C. Divisibility of Copyright36
Copyright secured under the present act is in theory "indivisible."
Under the theory of indivisibility, a complete transfer of one of the
rights under a copyright cannot be made by the copyright proprietor
unless it is accompanied by a transfer of all the other rights under the
copyright.36 9 As a practical matter, however, the exclusive license of a
specific right by the proprietor amounts to an "assignment" of that,
right and is frequently denominated as such by the transferor and the
transferee.
The theory of indivisibility has created certain problems in connection
with such grants. Perhaps the most difficult of these is whether the
transferee of less than all rights under the copyright has standing to
sue (without joining as a party the owner of the remaining rights under
the copyright) for infringement of the right which has been transferred
to him.170 The Report recommends that the revised act provide specif-
ically that each of the rights under a copyright may be assigned sepa-
rately and that the assignee of any specific right be entitled to sue in
his own name for infringement of that right.37'
Specific recognition of divisibility under the revised act would mean
that the proprietor of any separate right under the copyright would be
entitled to put his own name in the copyright notice. This might lead to
some confusion as to who owns the specific rights which a prospective
user may wish to acquire. The chain of title recorded in the Copyright
Office records, however, would be available to him; and he would be
permitted to rely in good faith on the facts disclosed in such records.
366 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., supra note 363.
367 Report, at 90.
368 For the general background, see Kaminstein, "Divisibility of Copyrights," Copyright
Law Revision Study No. 11, supra note 26, at 1 (1957).
309 See Kaminstein, supra note 368, at 11.
370 See Report, at 91. Cf. Kaminstein, supra note 368, at 15, 22.
371 Report, at 92. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19-22 spell out procedural safeguards with respect to
joinder and intervention of parties, and anyone else having an interest in the subject
matter of the infringement suit would presumably be able to have his day in court.
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In the absence of further information appearing in the records, the
prospective user would be able to deal with the person named in the
notice, who would act as trustee for any other owner.3 2
D. Protection of Authors Against Unremunerative Transfers373
In perhaps its most controversial single recommendation, the Report
makes the proposal that no transfer made by an author (or his repre-
sentative or heirs) for a lump sum consideration shall be valid for a
period of more than twenty years.3 4 If a right is to be obtained under
the copyright for any period longer than twenty years, the transferee
would have to undertake a continuing payment to the transferor of
royalties based on the exploitation of the work or the revenue derived
from it."'
372 Report, at 92.
373 For the general background, see Ringer, "Renewal of Copyright," Copyright Law
Revision Study No. 31, supra note 26, 105, passim, and especially at 125, 188-90 and
208-16 (1960).
374 Report, at 94. The controversy can be indicated by comparing the position of The
Authors League of America, Inc. with that of the Motion Picture Ass'n of America, Inc. In
a letter from the Authors League Copyright Committee to the Register of Copyrights, Feb.
23, 1962, submitting the Authors League's comments on the Report, the League takes the
following position:
We approve the Register's recommendation that a twenty year limitation be placed on
transfers of copyrights. However, we believe, it should apply to all transfers, including
those made on a royalty basis.
... Seldom, if ever,is ... unlimited assignment in the author's interest; it usually
is made because he does not have equal bargaining power to withstand the user's
demand for it.
'.No exception should be made for royalty assignments. It would make the 20-year
limitation ineffective in all instances.
Id. at 16, 17.
The commentary on the Report by the MPAA Copyright Committee, supra note 244,
on the other hand, states:
Perhaps the most disturbing portions to us of the Register's proposals are in his
recommendations . . . to permit authors and their heirs to recapture and renegotiate
their assignments to rights under copyright after twenty years ....
This is intrusion by the government into business in one industry. If this be the
direction of the law, we might as well suggest the same ideas to Congress as to all
property and all industries.
SWe shall oppose these proposals with candor and vigor as long as their inclusion
in a general revision of the copyright law is mooted.
Id. at 21, 27.
In the light of the quoted comments, it may be appropriate at this point to recall the
history of other revision efforts in the past half-century:
It may be said in general that the major controversies were rooted in the conflicting
interests of the various author and publisher groups on the one hand, and the users
of copyright material-such as broadcasters, motion picture producers, and record
manufacturers-on the other hand. Each effort to revise the law resolved itself into
an attempt to reconcile this conflict of interests through extended discussion and
negotiation with the various groups concerned in order to work out compromise solu-
tions to the controversial issues. Such an attempt was successful in the enactment of the
1909 revision and almost succeeded with the Vestal bill in 1931.
Goldman, supra note 15, at 11.
375 The Report makes a related proposal, discussed in text at notes 140-46, supra, that
the benefits of the extended renewal term in pre-existing works under the new Act should
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The Report takes the position that "authors are often in a relatively
poor bargaining position,"176 and points out that the laws of many for-
eign countries in one way or another seek to protect authors against un-
remunerative transfers by prohibiting the effectiveness of transfers for
more than a maximum period of time, by prohibiting transfers for a
lump sum, or by imposing a statutory minimum on the author's roy-
alties. But the Report recognizes that the automatic reversionary prin-
ciple of our renewal system has failed in its purpose and has instead
provoked much litigation.377  It also rejects another common feature
of foreign copyright laws, with the statement that
statutory specifications [of the terms and conditions of transfer agree-
ments] or prohibitions [of transfers on any particular terms] may ham-
per authors, as well as potential users, in arranging for the exploitation
of copyright works .
37
In the view of the Report, there is, however, one form of transaction
which is most likely to result in the author's receipt of less than the
fair value of the rights in his work. This is the transfer for a lump-
sum payment. The Report recommends that this form of transfer be
limited to a period of twenty years. From the standpoint of fairness,
the Report's position is valid, insofar as it refers to authors who lack
bargaining power: the first author, the unknown, the writer who re-
ceives critical acclaim but commercial rejection, etc. For the best-
selling author and the top songwriter, however, the imposition of such
a statutory restriction would appear to be an improper interference
with the bargaining process.
But if we consider the question of administrative practicality, the
question of fairness or unfairness is perhaps rendered academic. For,
against the background of the many different forms of business ar-
rangements utilized today, a statutory requirement of a continuing
royalty or other payment to the author is most likely unworkable. 79
E. Execution and Recordation of Transfers380
The Report makes several recommendations to maintain and to in-
crease the usefulness of the present copyright recording system. One
go to the author or his heirs, and that therefore any rights assigned under a lump-sum grant
should automatically revert for such extended period. The discussion at this point of the
proposed general limitation on lump-sum transfers therefore overlaps this article's earlier
discussion where cited above.
376 Report, at 92.
377 Ibid.
378 Id. at 93.
379 See text at note 145 supra.
380 For the general background, see Latman, "The Recordation of Copyright Assign-
ments and Licenses," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 19, supra note 26, at 107 (1958).
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of the more important of these is the clarification of an ambiguity in the
recording provisions of the present act. Under this provision, the earlier
of two conflicting assignments prevails when it is recorded within the
statutory grace period (three months after execution in the United
States, or six months after execution abroad). 11 If, however, the earlier
transfer is not recorded within the grace period, but is nonetheless
recorded prior to the recordation of the later transfer to a bona fide
purchaser, the statute is silent as to whether the earlier or later transfer
prevails. 82 Under the Report's proposal, the earlier of the conflicting
transfers would prevail if it is recorded within the grace period or at
any time prior to the recordation of the later transfer.38 3 Although
the Report does not recommend that recordation of nonexclusive licenses
be required, it does recommend that such a license, if taken in good
faith from the copyright owner of record, should remain effective
against a prior unrecorded assignment.8 4
Viewing another facet of the recording system, the Report states that
the system should encourage broader disclosure of pertinent facts in
the Copyright Office records and at the same time should avoid charging
third parties with constructive notice of facts not clearly of record.
Accordingly, it favors that the new act deny constructive notice to
those facts not set forth in the recorded instrument itself (i.e., incorpo-
rated only by reference) and with respect to those works not specifically
identified in the instrument (e.g., designated only as part of a blanket




In essence, the remedies for infringement provided by the present
883 Every assignment of copyright shall be recorded in the copyright office within
three calendar months after its execution in the United States or within six calendar
months after its execution without the limits of the United States, in default of which
it shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable con-
sideration, without notice, whose assignment has been duly recorded.
17 U.S.C. § 30 (1958).
882 See Latman, supra note 380, at 120-22; Report, at 97.
883 The statute should provide that if an assignment is not recorded within 1 month
after its execution in the United States, or within 3 months after its execution abroad,
or before the recordation of a subsequent assignment, then the subsequent assignment
will prevail when it is taken for a valuable consideration without notice and recorded
first.
Report, at 98.
384 "The statute should specify that a nonexclusive license taken without notice of an
unrecorded assignment will be valid as against the assignee; and that a nonexclusive license,
though not recorded, will be valid as against a subsequent assignment." Ibid.
385 Id. at 95-96, 98.
886 Report ch. IX, at 99-109. For the general background, see Strauss, "The Damage
Provisions of the Copyright Law," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 22, supra note 26,
at 1 (1956); Brown, "The Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An
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act include: an injunction against the infringement; 8 7 the impounding
and destruction of infringing copies and devices for making them;38
and an award of (1) the greater of the copyright owner's actual damages
plus the infringer's profits or (2) of statutory damages, the latter
in a discretionary amount generally not less than two hundred fifty
dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.38 9 The prevailing party
is allowed costs and, in the discretion of the court, reasonable attorney's
fees.3
9 0
The recommendations of the Report in this area aim primarily to
clarify the meaning of the statutory provisions by eliminating some of
the encrusted verbiage which hinders their usefulness. There is am-
biguity, for example, as to whether the copyright owner's remedies of
an award of his actual damages "as well as" an award of the infringer's
profits391 are cumulative or alternative where the infringer's profits are
more than a measure of the damages.3 92 The Report recommends that the
revised act state the copyright owner's remedy to be the award of
either damages or profits, whichever is greater.393 Also, in view of the
conflict in court decisions as to whether the infringer's "profits" are to
include the profits from the entire infringing work or only from the
specific portion of the defendant's work which infringes the plaintiff's
copyrights,3 94 the Report recommends that the new statute specifically
permit the court to apportion the infringer's profits in those cases where
the court deems apportionment to be just. 95
The provision for statutory damages serves to deter infringements and
to establish criteria for the amount of damages where the copyright
owner's actual damages or the infringer's actual profits are minimal or
difficult to ascertain. The Report discusses the opposing positions of
certain creators and users with respect to a mandatory minimum of
statutory damages in actions against innocent infringers: the former
Exploratory Study," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 23, supra note 26, at 59 (1958);
Strauss, "Remedies Other than Damages for Copyright Infringement," Copyright law Revi-
sion Study No. 24, supra note 26, at 111 (1959); Latman & Tager, "Liability of Innocent
Infringers of Copyrights," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 25, supra note 26, at 135
(1958).
387 17 U.S.C. 1 101(a) (1958).
388 Id. § 101 (c), (d).
389 Id.§ 101(b).
390 Id. § 116.
391 Id.§ 101(b).
392 Compare with H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1909) the cases of
Ziegelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1954), and Sebring Pottery Co. v. Steuben-
ville Pottery Co., 9 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ohio 1932). See Strauss, supra note 386, at S.
S93 Report, at 102.
394 E.g., compare Belford v. Scribner, 144 U.S. 488 (1892), and Callaghan v. Myers,
128 U.S. 617 (1888), with Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940),
and Universal Pictures Co., Inc. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
See Strauss, supra note 386, at 5-6.
395 Report, at 102.
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group favoring the retention of a mandatory minimum and the latter
group expressing concern that an unwitting infringer may perhaps be
penalized too severely by the automatic imposition of a minimum. It
is the position of the Report that imposing a two hundred fifty dollar
minimum in statutory damages on an unwitting infringer does not serve
to deter infringement.396 It proposes, accordingly, that where an infringer
has carried the burden of proving his innocence, the statutory minimum
should not be mandatory but, rather, the court should have discretion
to withhold statutory damages or to award less than two hundred fifty
dollars, as it deems just.
39 7
The Report notes that concern has been expressed by motion picture
and broadcasting groups that, in a case involving multiple infringements,
the court may apply the statutory damage formula mechanically by
multiplying the two hundred fifty dollar minimum by the number of
infringements. It therefore proposes that the new statute specify that
where statutory damages are to be awarded in a case of multiple infringe-
ments, the prescribed minimum and maximum are to govern the total
statutory damages awarded for all of the infringements.
3 98  
1
The Report recommends that the present maximum limit of statutory
damages be increased from five thousand to ten thousand dollars and
cites three valid reasons:1 99 first, the five thousand dollar maximum was
adopted in 1909, more than a half century ago, when the value of the
dollar was considerably higher than its present value; second, in the
light of the change suggested for the application of statutory damages to
multiple infringements, the maximum should be high enough to permit
the court to award an adequate total sum for the multiple infringement;
and third, (a reason somewhat similar to the second), the Report has
also recommended the deletion of the present provision permitting an
award of statutory damages in excess of the maximum where infringe-
ment occurs after actual notice to the infringer 400 and recommended a
higher maximum to permit a more adequate award in such a case.
X
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF COPYRIGHT
401
A. Works of Foreign Authors
The present international copyright relations of the United States are
governed, in the main, by our adherence to two multilateral copyright
396 Id. at 103-104.
397 Id. at 107.
398 Id. at 104-105.
399 Id. at 106.
400 Ibid.
401 Report ch. X, at 111-26. For the general background, see Bogsch, "Protection of
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conventions and the issuance of numerous presidential proclamations
with respect to individual countries. The conventions are the Universal
Copyright Convention (the "UCC") 40 2 and the Pan American Conven-
tion of 1910.4o3 The UCC, by far the more significant, includes among
its members (numbering forty-one at this writing) most of the major
producers and users of copyrighted works.404 The Pan American Conven-
tion in its- 1910 version (the version also known as the Buenos Aires
Convention) is adhered to by sixteen Latin American countries and the
United States.
40 5
Prior to World War II the only major international copyright con-
vention was the Berne Convention.40 Our membership in the Berne
Union was effectively precluded, however, by our insistence on retaining
certain features in our act (e.g., the copyright notice and the manufac-
turing clause) which were inconsistent with the original and subsequent
versions of the convention. With the ratification of the UCC by the
United States in 1954, however, the United States agreed to waive certain
domestic requirements for foreign works protected under the UCC. In
return, the member countries of the UCC agreed to utilize an agreed form
of copyright notice as a condition for securing protection in this coun-
try.40 7 Protection under the UCC is founded on the principle of "national
treatment": each member country agrees to grant the same protection
to the unpublished works of other member countries as it grants to the
unpublished works of its own nationals; and it agrees to grant the same
protection to the published works of other member countries as it grants
to the works of its own nationals first published in its own territory. 0 8
In recognition of the fact that American works are today protected in
almost all countries in which the exploitation of such works is of com-
mercial value, the Report recommends that the revised act make copy-
right protection available to the works of all authors, regardless of their
nationality or domicile or the place of first publication of their works.4 09
Works of Foreign Origin," Copyright Law Revision Study No. 32, supra note 26, at 1
(1959) ; Varmer, "Copyright in Territories and Possessions of the United States," Copyright
Law Revision Study No. 34, supra note 26, at 43 (1959).
402 [1952] 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2731.
403 August 11, 1910, 38 Stat. 1785.
404 See 14 UNESCO Copyright Bulletin 143-44 (1961); Copyright Office Circular 37,
Annex A (May, 1962).
405 See Copyright Office Circular 37, Annex B (May, 1959).
406 See note 23, supra.
407 The Act of August 31, 1954, ch. 1161, 68 Stat. 1930, amended the Copyright Act to
permit our ratification of the UCC. The copyright notice to be utilized for American pro-
tection of works pursuant to the UCC is prescribed by art. III, if 1.
408 UCC art. II. The works deemed to be those of another member country include not
only the works of that country's own nationals but also works of any other nationals
which are first published in that country. Ibid.
409 Report, at 118-19. To encourage other countries to adhere to the UCC, however, the
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This recommendation, although a radical departure from the present
basis for protection of foreign works, would do much to eliminate com-
plexity with respect to the protection of foreign works in this country,
and would perhaps increase our prestige abroad-a helpful increment,
considering the state of contemporary international affairs. To safeguard
against the possibility, however, that a foreign country may give insuf-
ficient protection to American works, the Report further recommends
that the President be authorized in such event to restrict the protection
granted to the works of that country.
4 10
B. The Manufacturing Clause
The present Copyright Act contains a "manufacturing clause" which
conditions copyright for certain works on their manufacture in this coun-
try. 1' These works include English-language books and periodicals
written by either American or foreign authors; foreign-language books
and periodicals authored by Americans; and many pictorial works. The
restrictions of the manufacturing clause are further implemented by a
prohibition against the importation of such works not produced in com-
pliance with such restrictions.412 Inasmuch as the UCC does not permit
the United States to require domestic manufacture of certain works
protected under that convention, 413 the Copyright Act was specifically
amended in 1954 to abrogate the requirements of the manufacturing
clause and the accompanying import restrictions for foreign works first
published abroad which are seeking United States protection pursuant
to the UCC.
4 14
The manufacturing clause was originally inserted in our copyright law
in 1891 when protection was first granted to the published works of
foreign authors. 5 The printing industry had expressed the fear that the
granting of copyright protection to works printed abroad would inflict
substantial damage to an American industry busily engaged in the print-
ing of piratical copies of foreign works.416 Today, however, as was
brought out in the Congressional consideration of the UCC, it is uncer-
tain whether there is any substantial competition with American printers
by reason of the importation of works printed abroad.417 But in terms
special exemption which UCC works enjoy from certain formal requirements would con-
tinue. Ibid.
410 Id. at 119.
411 17 U.S.C. § 16 (1958).
412 Id. § 107.
413 UCC art. III, ff 1.
414 See note 407, supra.
415 Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565 § 3, 26 Stat. 1106.
416 See Report, at 119-20.
417 See Report, at 122-23; S. Exec. Rep. No. 5, 83d Cong., 2d Sess 11-14 (1954); S.
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of copyright legislation, the real issue is not whether American printers
require protection against competition from foreign printers. If Congress
deems that such protection is needed, the protection should be embodied
not in a copyright statute but in the Tariff Act.41
The real question in connection with copyright legislation is whether
the manufacturing clause constitutes an unreasonable burden upon crer
ators and thus impairs the constitutional purpose of the Copyright Act
"to promote the progress of science and useful arts." The present writer
would answer this question in the affirmative. The manufacturing clause
is perhaps rivaled only by the present system of renewal copyright in the
needless trouble and complication which it inflicts not merely on the legal
practitioner but on the creators and users of copyrighted works. Photo-
graphers and artists, for example, bear a special burden under this pro-
vision, in view of the costs which make unfeasible the domestic publica-
tion of many books of photographs or reproductions of works of art. The
cost of quality reproduction of such works in this country has forced many
Americans to arrange for the first publication of their material in works
manufactured abroad, with the consequent loss in many cases of their
American copyright protection. 19
Those creators with established reputations have sometimes been able
either to have their works produced in this country or to retain counsel
to work out elaborate arrangements to comply with the manufacturing
clause for editions of their works actually produced abroad. Less-estab-
lished creators, however, usually have not been able to work either such
arrangement, with the net result that the encouragement of their art and
the wide dissemination of their work has been inhibited.
The abrogation of the manufacturing clause by the 1954 amendment
for foreign authors qualifying under the UCC420 has had the anomalous
result that a provision originally designed to protect American interests
in many cases now works a discrimination in favor of foreign authors and
against their American counterparts.4 21
The Report recommends that the manufacturing clause be deleted in
the revised act.422 The writer strongly supports this recommendation.
Rep. No. 1936, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1954); H.R. Rep. No. 2608, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
2-4 (1954).
418 See Report, at 123-24.
419 See Report, at 122; Younger, "Citizens Who Publish Abroad: A Study in the
Pathology of American Copyright Law," 44 Cornell L.Q. 215 (1959).
420 See note 407, supra.
421 See Younger, supra note 419, at 230-31.
422 Report, at 124.
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The present act provides that no copyright shall subsist in any publica-
tion of the United States Government, but that the publication or repub-
lication by the government of any material in which copyright is sub-
sisting shall not forfeit the copyright in such material.42 5 In addition, the
Printing Law provides that no publication privately produced from gov-
ernment plates and no other Government publication shall be copy-
righted.4 26 "Government," in these contexts, however, does not include
state and local governments: although public policy precludes copyright
in the text of official state documents such as statutes and judicial de-
cisions, the general informational material published by state govern-
ments can validly be copyrighted.2 7 But the definition of a "government
publication" remains ambiguous under the present law. The Report
therefore recommends that the term should be defined to mean "pub-
lished works produced for the government by its officers or employees"
(presumably limited, however, to works produced within'the scope of
their employment) and to avoid duplication and possible confusion, the
parallel provision in the Printing Law should be deleted. 28
There may, nonetheless, be certain exceptional circumstances, accord-
ing to the Report, in which a publication of the government should be
protected by copyright.42 9 In this connection, the Report refers to the
views of a number of government agencies with extensive publication
programs.430 The agencies concurred that as a general rule there should
be no copyright in government publication, but as exceptional instances
to the contrary they cited a work which may be the joint product of a
government agency and a private organization; a work being published
commercially on behalf of an agency; and a work produced by a gov-
ernment agency under a grant from a private organization. The Report
recommends that to cover instances such as these a central government
423 Report ch. XI, at 127-38.
424 For the general background, see Berger, "Copyright in Government Publications,"
Copyright Law Revision Study No. 33, supra note 26, at 23 (1959).
425 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1958).
426 28 Stat. 608 (1895), 44 U.S.C. § 58 (1958).
427 See Berger, supra note 424, at 27-28; Report, at 129-30.
428 Report, at 133. Such a definition would perhaps remove the ambiguity which in part
occasioned the dispute in Public Affairs Associates, Inc. V. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C.
Cir. 1960), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 82 Sup. Ct. 580 (1962), where an admiral's
public speeches on the subject of current naval developments were held to be his personal
property, notwithstanding his government employment.
429 Report, at 131-32.
430 See Berger, supra note 424, at 38-40.
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agency (such as the Bureau of the Budget or the Joint Congressional
Committee on Printing) be permitted under the statute to grant ex-
ceptions to the general rule that no copyright is to subsist in government
publications.
431
On balance, the recommendation for government copyright appears
to be acceptable, but such a provision should be drafted carefully in
order that the central government agency shall have neither the power
of censorship nor the power to grant unreasonable privileges to private
persons. For example, one of the premises cited by the Report for the
desirability of such a provision is that the governmental agency may
have "reason to believe that reproduction of a publication must be con-
trolled to prevent distortion in a dangerous manner."4 32 When the gov-
ernment seeks the power to prevent "distortion" of its publications, the
Congress should carefully consider the possible inroads made on free
speech. If the "distortion" is in deceptive use of the material in adver-
tising, as the Copyright Law Revision Study on this question seems to
indicate, 43 3 the proper remedy does not lie in the amendment of the
Copyright Act.
B. Regulation of the Performing Rights Organizations
The Report notes that while performing rights organizations, such as
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP),
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and SESAC, Inc. (formerly the Society
of European Stage Authors and Composers), customarily operate under
governmental regulation in most foreign countries, no such general regu-
lation is in effect in the United States.434 Both ASCAP and BMI, how-
ever, have been defendants in antitrust proceedings, as a result of which
consent decrees are in effect with respect to both organizations.
435
The Report makes no recommendation with respect to the regulation
of performing rights organizations, preferring instead to leave this
question to further study and consideration by Congress apart from
the general question of revision of the Copyright Act.- The Report's
position appears sound. To the extent that Congress becomes enmeshed
in peripheral issues before enacting a revised copyright statute, revision
is less likely to be achieved. Whether the performing rights organiza-
tions should be regulated by a governmental agency or should come
431 Report, at 133.
432 Id. at 131. See Berger, supra note 424, at 42.
433 Berger, supra note 424, at 42.
434 Report, at 136-38.
435 See note 272, supra.
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under the general provisions of the antitrust laws is a- question which




A. The Catalog of Copyright Entries438
The act presently requires the Copyright Office to prepare and to
offer for sale to the public at periodic intervals an indexed catalog of
copyright registrations. 439 The Report recommends that the Register
should not be under a Congressional mandate to issue a printed catalog,
but should instead be authorized to make his own determination as to
whether the various parts of the catalog should be issued and in what
form.4 ° Under this recommendation, the Register would have authority
to omit portions of the catalog appearing to be useful only to a small
number of persons, although such catalogs as are issued would continue
to be available for free distribution to libraries and for sale to the public.
B. Fees
In its recommendations concerning the fees to be charged by the Copy-
right Office, the Report proposes that the fee for all original and renewal
registrations should be uniform, instead of, as at present, four dollars
for the former and two dollars for the latter.441 If in fact the renewal
system is to be continued under the revised act, the writer suggests that
those works (e.g., poems, photographs, illustrations, etc.) which were
originally copyrighted as components of larger composite works (e.g.,
books and periodicals) should be renewable at a lower fee than required
for other works, or perhaps at no fee at all. True, the burden of the
Copyright Office in renewal of components may be equal or greater
than the burden in renewal of other works; but, on balance, the burden
upon the renewal claimant is much more onerous where, as in some
instances, he must strive to renew hundreds (or more) of such smaller
works. This question relates also to the theory put forth in the Report
that renewal is not "too great a burden" for those copyright proprietors
436 In this respect, the regulation of the performing rights societies is analogous to the
manufacturing clause in the present Copyright Act: If the domestic printing industry is to
receive congressional protection, that protection should be embodied not in the copyright
statute but in tariff legislation. See text at notes 415-18, supra.
437 Report ch. XII, at 139-146.
438 For the general background, see Dunne & Rogers, "The Catalog of Copyright Entries,"
Copyright Law Revision Study No. 21, supra note 26, at 51 (1960).
439 17 U.S.C. .§§ 210, 211 (1958).
440 Report, at 145.
441 Report, at 146. The fees are presently set forth in the schedule contained in 17 U.S.C.
§ 215 (1958), and include a $6 fee for registration of commercial prints and labels.
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who wish to protect their works for a second term of copyright.442 The
validity of such a theory can be questioned. If, however, the theory
is to be put into practice in the revision of the act, the burden of the
mere time and effort required for filing innumerable renewals for the
smaller works described above should not be compounded with the
burden of a renewal fee larger than at present.
CONCLUSION
The problems under the present Copyright Act are manifest and many.
The need for copyright law revision cannot be gainsaid. Only general
revision can oblige the growth and change of the half-century since our
present Copyright Act was enacted.
The Report has given a substantial impetus to the revision effort, an
effort which, it is hoped, will continue its momentum. This article has
been premised on the need for revision and the recognition that the
Report must be discussed widely if revision is to be achieved. If the
effort at revision falters, it will likely do so for the same reason which
obstructed the earlier revision efforts of this century. Those efforts
failed. They failed largely because the various industry groups-creators
and users-were unable to come to substantial agreement. The writer
hopes that the continuing discussion of the revision proposals under
the leadership of the Copyright Office and the various bar associations
will enable the current revision program to avoid the fate of its pred-
ecessors.
Congress is today understandably preoccupied with the grave prob-
lems of survival in the space age, and with the many foreign and domes-
tic questions which must be legislated upon to that end. If the burden
is thrust upon Congress to resolve sharp controversies between various
groups of creators and users over highly technical questions of copy-
right revision legislation, it is quite possible that resolution will be de-
ferred in favor of considering the more portentous questions referred
to above.
The Constitution does not indicate that it is the prime purpose of the
Copyright Act to promote the welfare of creators or users. It is of
course necessary to provide incentives to creators to create literary and
artistic works and to users to disseminate these works. But the lesson
of history is that creators and users must avoid the philippics of the
past if copyright law revision is to be achieved. Thus it becomes neces-
sary to belabor the obvious in order to admonish both creators and users
that the Constitution does not choose sides between them but aims only
to achieve the greater public good: the progress of science and useful arts.
442 Report, at 52.
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APPENDIX*
THE REPORT IN SUMMARY
The following summary is intended to highlight some of the principal
recommendations of the report without analyzing their background or des-
cribing how the provision would operate. It is necessarily oversimplified.
WORKS AND R IGHTS PROTECTED
Scope of works protected.-The report proposes that the statute drop the
present reference to "all the writings of an author." Instead, the kinds of works
to be protected would be specified in terms broad enough to cover everything
now considered copyrightable, including future works presented in newly
developed forms or media.
Architecture and applied art.-The report recommends that the coypright
statute should not be extended to functional architectural structures or
industrial designs as such, but that they should be given more limited
protection under separate design legislation. However, when a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work is used as a design or decoration of a useful article,
it would continue to have all the protection now afforded by the copyright law.
Choreography and sound recordings.-The report recommends that the
statute expressly cover choreographic works prepared for presentation to an
audience. It also favors the principle of protecting sound recordings against
unauthorized duplication, but makes no specific proposals pending further
study.
Rights protected and "fair use."--In general the report proposes to retain
the exclusive rights given to copyright owners under the present law-to
make and publish copies, to make new versions, to give public performances,
and to make recordings. It would, however, add a provision to the statute
specifically recognizing the doctrine of fair use.
Library photocopying.-The report would permit a library to make a single
photocopy of material in its collections for research purposes under explicit
conditions.
Performing rights.-As under the present law, the copyright owner of a
dramatic work would have the exclusive right to perform it in public, and
this right would be extended to all choreographic works and motion pictures.
The performing right in nondramatic literary and musical works would
continue to be limited to public performances "for profit." The mere reception
of a broadcast of copyrighted material at no charge to the public would be
excluded from the public performance right.
Jukebox exemption-The report favors enactment, in advance of the
general revision, of proposed legislation to repeal or modify the provision
exempting jukebox operators from payment of performance royalties.
Compulsory license.-The present law provides that, when the copyright
owner of music once permits it to be recorded, anyone else may record it
upon payment of a statutory royalty. It is recommended that this "compulsory
license" be eliminated.
* This appendix is taken verbatim from the Report (at v-vii).
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BEGINNING AND LENGTH OF COPYRIGHT TERM
"Public dissemination.'--Works are now protected by the common law
until they are either published in copies or registered voluntarily in un-
published form. The report proposes that common law protection should end,
and the term of statutory copyright should begin, when a work has been
"publicly disseminated" in any of the following ways: (1) publication of
copies, (2) registration, (3) public performance, or (4) public distribution
of sound recordings.
Voluntary registration.-The privilege of securing statutory copyright by
voluntary registration-now available for some classes of unpublished works
only-would be extended to all classes of undisseminated works.
Manuscripts in libraries.-The report also proposes to terminate common
law rights, after a period of time, in manuscripts made available to the
public in a library.
Duration of term.-The present term of copyright is 28 years from first
publication or registration, renewable by certain persons for a second period
of 28 years. The report recommends that the maximum term be increased
from 56 to 76 years. With certain exceptions, the basic term would run
for 28 years from first public dissemination, and would be renewable for a
second term of 48 years. Unlike the present law, the second term would merely
be an extension of existing rights. Any person claiming an interest in the
copyright could submit the renewal application, and the longer term would
accrue to the benefit of everyone holding any interest under the copyright.
Limitation on lump-sum assignments.-Under the present law the renewal
copyright reverts in certain situations to the author or other specified bene-
ficiaries. The report proposes to drop this reversion and to substitute a
limitation on the duration of lump-sum assignments. Any assignment by an
author or his heirs would not be effective after 20 years unless it provided for
continuing royalties based on use or revenue from the work.
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Notice of copyright.-The statute now requires, as a condition of copyright
protection, that the published copies of a work bear a copyright notice. The
report recommends that the requirement of notice on published copies be
retained, but that inadvertent omission or errors in the notice should not
forfeit the copyright. However, innocent infringers misled by the omission
or error would be shielded from liability.
Deposit and registration.-For works published with a copyright notice,
the present law also requires registration in the Copyright Office, including
the deposit of copies for the Library of Congress. The report proposes that
the deposit of copies wanted for the Library should be mandatory, but that
failure to register should not forfeit the copyright. However, application
for registration would still be a prerequisite to bringing an infringement suit.
And, unless registration is made within 3 months of first public dissemination,
certain special remedies could not be recovered for infringements begun
before registration.
OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHT
Ownership and divisibility.-The report would leave unchanged in most
respects the present law regarding the ownership of copyright. Copyright
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would be made divisible, however, so that ownership of the various rights
comprised in a copyright could be assigned separately. Under the present
law an assignment is not effective against third persons without notice unless
it is recorded, and this provision would be extended to exclusive licenses and
partial assignments.
Contributions to periodicals.-The report proposes that the copyright
secured by the publisher in a periodical or other composite work cover all
contributions not separately copyrighted. In the absence of an express assign-
ment, however, the publisher would hold in trust for the author all rights
in the contribution except the right to publish it in a similar composite work.
REMEDIES FOR INFRINGEMENT
Actual damages or profits.-Infringers are now liable for the actual
damages suffered by the coypright owner "as well as" the infringer's profits.
The report recommends clarifying the statute to provide for recovery either
of actual damages or of profits, whichever is higher.
Statutory damages.-If actual damages and profits are smaller than $250,
the court must now award statutory damages of at least $250. The report
recommends that the court should not be required to award the minimum of
$250 against an innocent infringer. It also proposes that the court be given
discretion to award up to $10,000 as the total sum of statutory damages
against any infringer.
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF COPYRIGHT
Copyright in foreign works.-At present statutory protection is available
to foreign works only if the author's country is covered by a copyright treaty
or Presidential proclamation. The report proposes to extend the copyright
statute to all foreign works but the President could restrict' or withhold
the application of the statute in the case of works originating in any particular
country.
Manufacturing clause.-Certain works must now be manufactured in the
United States to have coypright protection here. The report recommends
elimination of the manufacturing requirement and related import limitations.
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